On October 17, 1964, the world woke up to the shocking news that Communist China had tested a nuclear weapon. Codenamed "596", the test had successfully detonated a Uranium atom bomb in the remote Lop Nur desert the day before. "In delivering a heavy blow at the imperialist United States and its lackeys, the success of China’s nuclear test lends firm support to those oppressed nations and people in their struggle for liberation", an official communique stated.

How surprised was the U.S. administration? Although most in the Lyndon Johnson administration knew a test was more or less imminent, as late as one week earlier they were not sure of when to expect it; that summer many in the CIA had doubted it would happen before the end of the year, while the State Department had estimated an October 1 date. But to most citizens the news was shocking, in light of the American and Russian efforts on nuclear disarmament and especially the signing of the Limited-Test Ban Treaty the previous summer (although China never signed it). As you can hear in the two snippets above, President Johnson had to toe the line between disapproval and alarm.

The President's tone may have been more than a façade. Months before and after the Chinese test, top advisers had discussed the possibility of attacking Chinese nuclear test facilities. But President Johnson seems to have sided with those suggesting a more diplomatic approach; he even disliked even the comparatively mild 1965 report from the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (the Gilpatric Report), barring it from circulation beyond his cabinet. We should be happy that cooler heads prevailed; pulling the trigger on perceived nuclear threats has often meant trouble at other times.