[copied from a New York Times article published on Tuesday, April 25th, 1967. page 14]

Following is the text of an address by Gen. William C. Westmoreland at the annual luncheon yesterday of The Associated Press at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, followed by questions from the floor read by Paul Miller, president of the news agency, and answers by the general:

General's Address

My last visit to this hotel was in January, 1964, just before leaving for duty in Vietnam. I came by to see my friend, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur said to me: "I see you have a new job. I know you realize that this new assignment carries with it great opportunities, but it is also fraught with hazards." I now wonder whether this occasion is one of those opportunities
or one of those hazards. The situation in Vietnam has been accorded the most
intensive news coverage in history, As a result, Americans should have, by this
time, their own image of the war. But the question is: How accurate is this image? Do most Americans fully appreciate the character of the war and its complexity? I hope today I can contribute to better understanding. What kind of a war is being fought in Vietnam? How is it being fought? How is the battle going? What lies ahead? These are questions I will address. The Vietnamese, and we,
their allies, are involved in a total undertaking—a single, all-pervading confrontation in which the fate of the people of Vietnam, the independence of the free nations of Asia, and the future of emerging nations— as well as the reputation and the very honor of our country are at stake. At one and the same time, we must fight the enemy, protect the people, and help them build a nation in the pattern of their choice.

Real Objective Is People

The real objective of the war is the people. If the enemy could take Saigon, or the heavily populated areas of the delta, or both, the war would be over—without negotiation or conference. He lost this chance two years ago, and I
can promise you that his military tactics alone will not win him another opportunity. Yet, despite staggering combat losses, he clings to the belief that he will defeat us. And through a clever combination of psychological and political warfare, both here and abroad, he has gained support which gives him hope that he can win politically that which he cannot accomplish militarily. Many myths about the Vietcong still persist, and I hope I can dispel some of these here and now. The doctrine of conquest in South Vietnam is from the book of Mao Tse-tung. It is the standard three-phase pattern— the combination of subversive
political cells, guerrilla units and conventional military forces. Between 1954 and 1963, political cells, trained and directed from North Vietnam, were installed throughout South Vietnam. At the same time, Hanoi directed that the Vietcong begin recruiting and organizing guerrillas and training them in terror tactics. By late 1964 the combination of enemy political-guerrilla warfare and governmental instability in the South resulted in a decision by Hanoi to enter the decisive, and final, phase. Vietcong companies were formed into battalions, regiments and divisions, and North Vietnamese Army units began to infiltrate covertly to the South. Never at any time during those 10 years of subversion, terror and attack did Hanoi relax its control over the war against the people of South Vietnam. The goal of this aggression was then, and still is, the conquest of the South—reunification on Hanoi's terms.

Aggression, Not; Civil War

What we have is not a civil war. It is a massive campaign of external aggression
from North Vietnam. The political cells have created an enemy pseudo-government which still pervades the many villages and hamlets. The guerrillas wage constantly, mostly at night, the cruelest kind of war—terrorism— civilians are shot, bombed and mutilated as examples to those who might resist or defect, or simply because they are leaders. A typical example of Vietcong terror took place shortly before I left Vietnam. During the early morning hours of April 16, the Vietcong attacked a hamlet 20 miles north of Saigon. Among the victims were five Revolutionary Development team members. Three of them were women. Their hands were tied behind their backs and they were all shot through the head. During the last nine years, 53,000 Vietnamese—a large share of them teachers, policemen and elected or natural leaders—have been killed or kidnapped. Translated to the United States, that would be more than 600,000 people, with emphasis on mayors, councilmen, policemen, teachers, government officials and even journalists who would not submit to blackmail. At the other end of the war spectrum, we have fought in the South during the past year major elements of eight North Vietnamese divisions. We have captured thousands of weapons and large stores of ammunition and equipment which have been transported from North Vietnam. In summary: The Vietcong is not a legitimate national 1st movement. It is a movement organized, controlled and supported by the communist Government of North Vietnam. What support it gets from the people in South Vietnam is largely the result of terror, intimidation, and murder of those individuals who oppose it.

On the Verge of Defeat

Two years ago South Vietnam was on the verge of defeat. The enemy's main-force units were attacking with increased intensity from hidden bases and sanctuaries. The Government of Vietnam had arrived at a crossroad. It was a question of honoring a long-standing commitment by the United States to a young nation fighting for its freedom, or defaulting to the aggressor. Our President reaffirmed our commitment and made the courageous decision to stand firm—to stay the course. This meant using whatever military and economic power was necessary. Once we had major forces ashore we began to look for the enemy, and In was not hard to find. Major battles ensued; they were bitter and bloody. But in them we learned to make the most of our military assets. We also learned that the enemy has little regard for human life and, for propaganda purposes, will turn losses and defeats into absurd claims of victory. During the last year and a half we have sought out the enemy, caught him off guard, fought him before he was ready. For a time he stood and fought and we punished him severely. Now he is becoming more difficult to find. We have invaded his elaborate and widely scattered base areas — some of them built over a period of 20 years. Working closely with the Vietnamese forces we have moved into many of the populated and productive areas which formerly provided supplies and recruits to the enemy. We have turned the enemy's ambushes against him and we have learned how to draw him into an ambush. We have sent our deep patrols to find him. He has been punished by B-52 strikes and unparalleled close support from our tactical air, artillery and naval
gunfire. On land and sea we have made his infiltration costly. Although the military picture is favorable, I emphasize the fact that we have no evidence
to indicate that the enemy is slowing his invasion from the North, or that he is breaking up his major units and scattering them about, or that he is giving up his plans to try to inflict major defeat upon' us. He is taking great casualties and he docs have logistics problems, but his leadership is good and his men are tough and tenacious. He needs a victory for political, psychological and morale purposes, and he will continue to strive for one.

End Is Not In Sight

So the end is not in sight. The enemy can hide in the jungles and mountains of South Vietnam where we cannot reach him without major effort. He rests and regroups, trains and replenishes in hidden camps and supply areas in regions along the borders of neutral countries and the demilitarized zone which he overtly violated almost a year ago. He continues to recruit and train guerrillas for use as guides and intelligence agents for his main force units and for sabotage and terror. So we must be prepared for bitter fighting in days to come. Before leaving the military situation, I must honestly say that I am concerned about
cease-fire proposals. In other wars, a cease-fire was an acceptable condition, but, in this war, inevitably it will be a military advantage to the enemy and a detriment to our side. This is because of the clandestine character and covert
methods of the enemy. Traditionally he has used covertly cease-fire periods to reinforce and resupply his units, and to strengthen and realign his political posture. One of the regrettable facts of war—any war—is the casualties that arc not confined to the military forces involved. There are civilian casualties in Vietnam and these are of constant concern to me, my commanders and men.
But civilian casualties do not result from indiscriminate use of our firepower. They are caused by mechanical failure or human error. This is in sharp contrast to the Vietcong policy of calculated attacks on civilians. Never in the history of warfare have so many precautions been taken by men in combat. We cover an enemy-held area with leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts warning of impending attack. We do not permit an air strike or artillery fire on a moving column of enemy until Vietnamese officials give approval. Every possible precaution is taken to avoid casualties among civilians. Never has a nation employed its military power with such restraint. Vietnamese Forces Hailed
Now a word about the Vietnamese armed forces. I have worked with the Vietnamese military for more than three years, and I have learned to understand and admire them. A look,at their record in combat, as well as in political administration, reveals an exceptional performance when all it considered. During the last three years, I have seen them literally hold their country together.
Despite their military background they have taken long strides toward developing democratic processes and institutions. They fought the enemy guerrilla and main forces alone, until we arrived, and, during that time, they were expanding their forces to the limit that their manpower and economy could support. Except for the Continental Army of our earliest years, never before in history has a young military force been subjected to such a challenge. In my book, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces have conducted themselves with credit. As I tour the country several times each week, I am encouraged by the obvious improvement in the morale, proficiency and quality of their fighting force. Today the Republic of Vietnam armed forces arc working and fighting side by side with their allies—the Koreans, the Australians, the New Zealanders,
the Thais and the Filipinos, as well as the Americans, and they have earned the confidence of these stanch allies. The Vietnamese armed forces and the Vietnamese people arc aware of and appreciate our support. We know and they know we have assisted them for 12 years in the development of their military
organization. More important to the Vietnamese, I think, is the fact that our American servicemen are eager to help them build such things as schools, dispensaries and other things of lasting value to their communities. These civic action projects, voluntarily undertaken by our troops and those of our allies, are inspiring to behold.

Helping the People

A young corporal undertakes the support of a Montagnard family whose breadwinner has been assassinated. An American squad or platoon adopts a hamlet, bringing to its people the material things they need and the
spiritual uplift which will help them to self-sufficiency. Many communities in Vietnam are living a better life because of the encouragement and help our American troops have given to them. A true missionary zeal among our
troops is commonplace and is one of the unique characteristics
of this war. I am constantly impressed by the concern for the lives of
others shown by the men of my command. As I travel among them, I see their courage against the enemy and their compassion toward their friends, and I am inspired by their example. I would like to tell you more about the men of my command. Today your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen;
-Are better educated than before.
-Are better informed.
-Have traditional American ingenuity and initiative.
-Are better physical specimens.
-Have high morale.
-And understand what the war is all about.
They know that they are helping to stop the spread of Communism in Southeast
Asia and to give the people of South Vietnam a freedom of choice. They have been given a job, and they are doing it well, and with pride. . . but they are dismayed, and so am I, by recent unpatriotic acts here at home. Who are these men? They are mostly youngsters representing every state of the Union — from the. farms, the cities, the factories and the campuses. They are the sound product of America's democratic society. They arc the sum of our educational system, our medical science and our communications. Their excellent morale results from knowledge of their jobs, sound military policies, professional unit leadership and unprecedented material support. Their medical care is superb, their food is excellent and their mail is carefully handled. Shortages have been few and of short duration. As an individual, this fighting man is a tough, determined professional in battle one day, and, the next day, a sensitive, compassionate friend helping the Vietnamese people. He is a fighter, a thinker, a doer. He has seen—at first hand—Communist subversion and aggression at work; he has acquired a deeper appreciation of the importance of freedom. And from his ranks in the years ahead will come the confident, alert, intelligent citizens and leaders who will make this nation's future greater than its past. With fighting forces like these a commander cannot help but look forward with confidence as he views the military situation. But I am mindful that the military war in South Vietnam is, from the enemy's point of view, only part of a protracted and carefully coordinated attack, waged in the international arena. Regrettably,
I see signs of enemy success in that world arena which he cannot match on the battlefield. He does not understand that American democracy is founded on
debate, and he sees every protest as evidence of crumbling morale and diminishing resolve. Thus, discouraged by repeated military defeats but encouraged by what he believes to be popular opposition to our effort in Vietnam, lie is determined to continue his aggression from the North. This, inevitably, will cost lives—American, Vietnamese and those of our other allies. I foresee, in the months ahead, same of the bitterest fighting of the war. But I have confidence In our battlefield capability. And I am confident of the support we and our allies will continue to receive from our President and from the Congress. The magnificent men and women I command in Vietnam have earned the unified support of the American people.

Question and Answers

Q. General Westmoreland, have you asked the Pentagon for more troops and how many ?

A. As commander, of our American forces In Vietnam, needless to say I'm constantly studying our troop requirements. I submit my requests from time to time, my desires, my estimates, to my senior military headquarters. I have been getting troops in considerable numbers during the past year. They are continuing to arrive. The number of troops that will ultimately be needed is a matter that will have to be studied In consideration of many factors — our estimate of the enemy's capabilities and intentions, the economy of South Vietnam—because as we deploy troops to those shores, we per so put pressure on their economy. And this is a factor that has to be considered. These matters and these factors will have to be reviewed at our senior levels in Washington. Needless to say, the discussions that have taken place are privileged and is a matter of military security. I cannot give you any definite numbers as to my estimate of the number of troops that will be required.

Bombing of Airfields

Q. Would you comment, please, on the bombing today in North Vietnam, an airfield there. What happens if the MIG's take sanctuary in Red China?

A. I was delighted to learn that the MIG airfields had been bombed, at least two of them today. This was a military target on which was based aircraft that had been used offensively against our fighter-bombers. It is true that MIG's could take sanctuary in China, as they did during the Korean War. But the MIG's would be at a disadvantage operating from those bases compared with those in North Vietnam. Their reaction time would be increased, and they would, threat to our fighter bombers, and the jeopardy to our very fine Air Force and Navy pilots would be reduced.

Q. There are daily statistics of the number of Vietcong killed but serious doubt about the body count announced of those that have been killed. What is your view, please, of the accuracy of this count?

A. Over a period of over three years, I have given this matter considerable personal attention. It is my judgment that the casualty figures that we estimate or state that we have inflicted on the enemy are accurate, perhaps conservative. True enough, then; could be from time to time some exaggeration. There could be some double counting of casualties. But in my opinion, this is more than offset by those enemy troops that are killed by artillery and air strikes that we never know about. Also, we do not claim credit in estimating and assessing our casualties on the enemy those that die of wounds. So, all factors considered, I feel that the figures that you receive that are announced by my headquarters in Saigon are definitely accurate and, I believe, on the conservative side, when all factors are considered.

Q. The next question reminds me to tell you that if the President were not in West Germany today, he had wanted to be here and introduce General Westmoreland, which—I was reminded of that by this question. Could you run this war without political help? As a matter of fact we wouldn't have had him here without political help. Anyway, general, could you run this war without political help and could you win this war if given a free hand in military decisions?

A. As a military man, it's a bit of an awkward question. I think it's impossible in view of the nature of the war— a war of both subversion and invasion, a war in which political and psychological factors are of such consequence— to sort out the war between the political and the military. Political factors must be considered. They must be considered in selecting targets. They must be considered in our actions involving nearby so-called neutral countries. They must be considered in the means that are used in pursuing the war. The reason for this is not only because of the complexity but also because of our national policy to confine this war to that of a limited war, and this means that means from time to time are limited. And that policy has been made loud and clear, that it is not our intention to expand the war. We want to keep it as a limited war, and, therefore, political factors have to be considered, and the decisions involved are necessarily above my level. Since I deal in military factors, I am responsible only for fighting the ground war in South Vietnam and only that air war in the so-called extended battle area.

Possibility of Escalation

Q. Here is a question that was asked—the same question that was asked in a number of different ways. What is the possibility of escalation of the war bringing in Red China and Soviet Russia and how effective would they be if they did come in?

A. This is a very difficult question to speculate on. From a military point of view I think we should be prepared for any contingencies. Of course, the U.S.S.R. is providing equipment to North Vietnam, primarily in terms of air-defense weapons and systems. The Communist Chinese are providing support in the form of transportation units, some antiaircraft weapons, but primarily infantry-type weapons to support the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong main-force units. I think this boils down to whether the U.S.S.R. and Red China feel that the threat to their form of government and their territory is of such consequence that they could hazard the risks that would necessarily be involved.

Q. Here are two that somewhat go together. Are you being given ample supplies, ammunition and manpower to win the war? Or are you expected to fight only a holding action? And along with that, do you see any possibility that Hanoi can be brought to the conference table short of an all-out military effort?

A. As we built up American forces in Vietnam, which Started approximately 18 months, well approximately two years ago, We had no logistic base. So while we were moving to the shores of South Vietnam combat troops, we had to concurrently develop ports, jet airfields, ammunition and supply dumps. For approximately a year we were fighting definitely a holding action. I had to maneuver troops all over the country by battalions to hold our own arid not give the enemy the benefit of a victory. During that period we were operating on a logistic shoestring. We had dozens, as a matter of fact in some cases 50 to 100, seagoing ships backed up because we did not have the deep-water piers and we did not have the lighterage to unload them nor the depots in which to deposit the supplies. So what we, in effect, had were a group of floating warehouses. In other words, the ships themselves became warehouses, and we unloaded these ships in a discriminating way in order to bring ashore those supplies that we needed. And during that period of time we did have some shortages, but they were of short duration, and I'm happy to say that in no case did they adversely affect our combat operations.

Solid Logistic Base

The work that has been performed by our logisticians has been magnificent and, I believe, almost unprecedented in military history. Now all of that is behind us. We now have a solid logistic base, one that is designed to support our combat troops anywhere in South Vietnam on a sustained combat basis. And about six months ago we were able to go on the offensive, where the enemy has had in most cases to react to our initiatives rather than our responding to his. Now I do not see any end of the war in sight. It's going to be a question of putting maximum pressure on the enemy anywhere and everywhere that we can. We will have to grind him down. In effect, we are fighting a war of attrition, and the only alternative is a war of annihilation, which I think we have ruled out as a matter of policy. Now we're in a better position to fight a war of attrition than the enemy. But we must have that resolve that I mentioned in my speech. And when the leadership in Hanoi appreciates that we do have that resolve, that we have committed ourselves and we. will stay with it as long as necessary, and when the leadership in Hanoi realize that the Republic of Vietnam is getting stronger politically, economically and militarily and that North Vietnam is being drained of its vitality by our bombing, by the cost of waging a massive war in the south, then and only then will the leadership in Hanoi sit back and reassess their strategy.

An All-American War?

Q. General, following up that thought, here's a question that does in a way, as the Americans have taken over a greater part of the war burden, South Vietnamese seem to be doing less. Is there a danger of making this an all-American war, with Americans on one side and the Asians on the other?

A. I think there is little danger or likelihood that that will happen. The South Vietnamese have been fighting this Communist enemy for many years. And they will continue to fight. And as I said in my prepared remarks, they're fighting now better than ever. I'm encouraged by tho improved military proficiency, their morale that I see every day. Whereas a year ago there were only about 30 of their 154 battalions considered combat ready, now I consider all but about six as combat effective. Their leadership is improving and this has been their major, problem, Now, it's quite understandable why the American people get a distorted idea as to the role of tho Vietnamese armed forces. After all, people in the United States want to read and hear about their troops. And although our press corps in Saigon are alert to move to the scene of a northern victory—and we've had quite a number recently—American people are more interested in actions involving their troops than those of the Vietnamese or the Koreans, or even the Australians. Their Losses Greater Now specifically, the Vietnamese armed forces are running more operations than we are. They're taking more casualties. They're—the percentage of the enemy that they kill compared with their losses are compared very favorably to ours. They do lose more weapons. These are lost primarily by the regional and popular forces—the paramilitary forces that frequently man isolated outposts, outposts that can be overrun by the enemy if he chooses to mass enough force against these outposts and attack with surprise. These outposts do not have the communications that we have. They do not have the fire support. A few weeks ago I was visiting a northern division commander who I have tremendous admiration for. He's one of the best in the country. And he made the unsolicited, remark to me—he said a year ago our regional and popular forces were no match to a Vietcong main-force unit—but he says now there are many, many cases where they're defeating the Vietcong main-, force regular units. And a year ago this was unheard of. More Improvement Seen Now I'm not suggesting that all battles between the enemy and the Vietnamese forces, regular or paramilitary, are victories for the South Vietnamese. But they're doing much, much better than they were doing a year ago. And I predict that they will continue to improve during the months ahead. After all, the Vietnamese armed forces have carried a tremendous burden. They have. held the country together, as I have pointed out. They had a thin veneer of leadership to begin with, which is understandable under the circumstances. But they've had to extend this to man new units, and during the last three years I've seen them expand by over 50 percent. This required new division commanders, regimental commanders, battalion commanders. They were having to fight this war alone until we arrived. Now that we are here, we can carry a major share of the burden against the , North Vietnamese regulars and against the Vietcong main-force units that are organized up to division strength. There are two—two Vietcong main-force regular divisions. And this has permitted them to devote more of their strength to fighting guerrillas, to protecting people in productive areas where the guerrillas roam. And the fighting of guerrillas involves breaking down into small. units, squads and platoons, and fighting at night, primarily. And they're killing a lot of guerrillas. But these are not spectacular battles. And because we—because we are confronting—the Americans, the Australians and the Koreans more of the North Vietnamese regular units, our battles are more spectacular and are more obvious to the people of this country who read the newspapers, listen to the radio and hear the television. But the Vietnamese are still very much in there. And I am very much encouraged by the progress that's being made.

Vietcong Indoctrination

Q. Just one or two more. The Vietcong are generally regarded to have fought well against rough odds for some time. To what do you attribute their spirit?

A. The Vietcong, organized. directed, commanded from Hanoi, have placed great emphasis on political indoctrination. As a matter of interest, their training program for their units devotes more time to political indoctrination than it does to military training. This indoctrination is well done and skillful and of course it's backed up by a ruthless cadre that use strong-arm methods, if required, to keep their troops in line. Now their so-called cadre, or leadership, are excellent. They have been well trained and indoctrinated, and they are committed. However, we have noted a number of recent trends that are encouraging. We are picking up more prisoners. We have more defectors coming. The rate seems to be increasing in a very encouraging way. We learn that many of the rank-and-file of these units would like very much to defect, to come in under the Government of Vietnam's amnesty program, the so-called Chieu Hoi program, but the cadre control them so tightly that they can't get away.

Friction Cited

We also know that there is considerable friction between the North Vietnamese leadership and the South Vietnamese—the Vietcong. North Vietnamese leaders are playing a — more and more a role in the south. The leadership in Hanoi is by their action putting in their own leadership, apparently because they do not trust some of the South Vietnamese leadership, and there is definite friction between these two regional groups. The number of defectors that we have received has been multiplying by a factor of two for the last several months, and hopefully this trend will continue. The number of senior defectors that are coming in is encouraging. Whereas a year ago our defectors were primarily confined to the lower ranks, but now we are getting some of the senior officers. And I talked to one the other day—a senior major. He told me that many members of this large headquarters that he served before defecting would like very much to defect but they had not been able to find a way. The control by the North Vietnamese leaders was of such consequence that they could not make the break.

Q. One last question, general, and sort of a personal one. Is it true that you may be coming home one of these days and that you have political ambitions when you do?

A. I'm a soldier and I think I have a fairly important job in South Vietnam today, and as such I have no political intentions, ambitions or aspirations, and I will remain at my post as long as my superior authorities wish me to do so.