A Former Palestinian Politician's Idea for Peace

Brian Lehrer: It's The Brian Lehrer Show on WNYC. Good morning, everyone. We have an opportunity today to speak with the former prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad, who has a proposal for reviving the two-state solution peace process. Salam Fayyad, not much known in this country, but well known to Israelis and Palestinians, was prime minister from 2007 to 2013, among other positions with the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas. He has also been an official of the World bank and International Monetary Fund.

He is now a visiting scholar at Princeton, and he has an article in Foreign Affairs Magazine called A Plan for Peace in Gaza. It includes release of the hostages and reforms that could allow the PLO to lead and the Palestinian Authority to govern, and a meaningful return to a two-state solution peace process. Let's hear what he has in mind and see what he thinks of some other people's ideas for what can come next amid the horror and grief and national traumas that both Israelis and Palestinians are going through. Prime Minister Fayyad, thank you so much for coming on to discuss your article on Foreign Affairs and your ideas with us. Welcome to WNYC.

Salam Fayyad: Thank you, Brian, for having me on. Thank you for your interest.

Brian Lehrer: For some historical context first and to let listeners get to know you a little bit, you became Palestinian Authority prime minister in 2007. That would be just after the election in Gaza, won by Hamas over the Palestinian Authority, PLO or Fatah. That was a shock to many in Israel and the west at the time because Hamas was a rejectionist group then as it is now, meaning not interested in a two-state solution with Israel. Looking back, why do you think the people of Gaza chose Hamas at that time?

Salam Fayyad: Well, thank you very much again for having me on, Brian. In terms of history, not much difference between what you said and what actually happened. I became prime minister of Palestinian Authority in June of 2002. Sorry, I joined the PA as finance minister in June 2002, but I became its prime minister in June 2007. That was about a year and a half after Hamas had won an outright majority in the last national elections we held in January 2006. After that win, Hamas ruled alone for about a year. Then a national unity government was formed comprised of Hamas, Fatah, and other factions. I was the minister of Finance on that cabinet. It lasted for about three months and then it fell.

Brian Lehrer: Just three months, that attempt at a national unity government, you're saying between the PLO and Hamas at that time?

Salam Fayyad: Exactly, all factions. As an independent, I was there as an independent, as finance minister in that government. It lasted for about three months and then it fell after the takeover of power by Hamas in Gaza in June of that year, upon which time I was asked to form a government, which I thought was going to last no more than a month, looking for a way in which the rift can be mended. Well, here we are in 2023, and still that state of separation exists.

It's not that the PA's role disappeared completely from Gaza over the period since 2007, but clearly it doesn't really have much of a footprint there, some functions and role, but there is no question that there existed in Gaza since 2007, a parallel structures of governance, each institution, there's one in West bank, there's one in Ramallah. Those in Gaza were and continue to be under Hamas's full control. That's a short rundown of history of my involvement.

I left government in 2013, but to your question as to why Hamas enjoyed the support it did at the time and surprised many by winning outright majority in the national elections held in January of 2006, actually, multiple factors, key amongst which, in my view, was by the time of elections, and this we're talking about now, about 13 years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, it had become clear, and we're looking at the period post [unintelligible 00:04:39] and the immediate Hamas was [unintelligible 00:04:41] 13 years into the "peace process" people have come to the realization that the bet taken by the PLO back in 1993 when it did enter into those agreements with Israel basically failed.

A state of Palestine, that was the promise of this operation from Palestinian point of view, did not happen when it was supposed to happen, 1999. Since then, over the six year up until the elections, clearly the hope and expectation that something like that might emerge anytime soon diminished. That's one thing. Hamas never was part of the PLO. From the very beginning, it and another key faction, Islamic Jihad, were outside of the PLO, of course, but they expressed opposition to the Oslo Accord, so that is history.

In fact, there were some factions within the PLO itself at the time, notably the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine, otherwise known as PFLP, was and continues to be a part of PLO but at the time, they beg to differ, so to speak. In any event, that whole paradigm, it was clear to people who went to the polls in January 2006 that that paradigm basically had failed and it was not likely to deliver anytime soon. That's one key reason.

Another factor which I actually hinted at, I mentioned, yes, I used one word there, which is misrule. The PA came into being as an interim body, entity to perform the role of a self rule, authority to manage the affairs of Palestinian people in West Bank and Gaza territory occupied by Israel in 1967. How you govern matters. It always matters. There were gaps, obviously, the task was never going to be easy, given that was supposed to happen under occupation and all, building institutions, capacity, and what have you.

There were obvious problems, and there continue to be problems to this day. You add that together, I remember Hamas at the time ran under the slogan of the world chose the PLO. Whom do you choose? Basically. Their slogan was, the bet the PLO made failed. The world is betting on the PLO, but that bet failed. What do you have to say about it? That was really key.

Brian Lehrer: Yes, the bet on the peace process. [crosstalk] You acknowledge in your Foreign Affairs article, as you were just acknowledging in that answer, that the Palestinian Authority has suffered over the long-term an erosion of legitimacy brought on by the failure of the Oslo peace process and what you call chronic misrule by the authorities. Turning to the current war and crisis, let's talk about the short-term first. For the immediate humanitarian crisis on both sides. You write in Foreign affairs that Hamas must unconditionally release the Israeli civilians it is holding. Do you see any prospect of anything that could get Hamas to do that?

Salam Fayyad: At the time I wrote the article, which was not long ago, actually, I thought that that was well in prospect. The reason I'm saying this is they released some, a few. That was a modest step in the right direction. Based on my analysis of the news stories coming out of that war zone and the mediation undertaken mainly by Qatar, there were others as well, that that definitely was well in prospect.

The other thing is reading statements made by Hamas leadership about this, what they're saying about this today, not today, but in the past few days, that they're willing to do this. What they're looking for is a respite to ensure safe passage, to ensure that they are able to collect together these captors because they're not in one place. I don't know where they are, obviously, but whether that really means all of them are under their control, or they still have to really talk to some people to ensure that they are all there, but that's what they're saying.

That's saying there, but I think on the face of this, there is, I think, reason to believe that these hostages are held. You would want to really ensure safe passage and under the press of the massive firepower that is being prosecuted by the government of Israel, and Israel army, clearly that is not going to happen. In other words, what I'm trying to say here, I don't believe Hamas is looking for a quid pro quo to release the hostages. That's my own assessment.

I think that's realistic. Now, so far as military personnel held captive, that's another story. In the past, there were multiple episodes, and this really does not go back to Hamas versus Israel confrontation. Going back to the last century, there were episodes of exchanges of prisoners and all. Most notable of these exchanges happened actually 2012. At the time, Israel exchanged one Israel soldier in captivity for about more than 1000, 1027 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. That's separate. Civilians, I think something like this could happen. I just don't see how realistically it can happen under the massive power that really continues to be prosecuted as we speak.

Brian Lehrer: Let me play a clip of Prime Minister Netanyahu and get your reaction, because Israel, of course, says its goal now is to destroy Hamas' infrastructure and ability to govern in Gaza. Nothing short of that would be acceptable because Hamas shows and says that it would launch more October 7th-style attacks if it remains viable. Let me play this very short clip of Netanyahu with ABC News this week and see if you think that cracked the door open to some kind of deal for the hostages with Hamas. Listen.

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Well, there'll be no general ceasefire in Gaza without the release of our hostages.

Brian Lehrer: Do I hear hostages for general ceasefire proposal in that, which is different from simply saying we're going to destroy Hamas?

Salam Fayyad: Yes, I think it could be interpreted that way. I think one cannot read those statements in isolation from the politics of the situation. Looking at the progression that took place actually in so far as statements made as to what the ultimate goal of the Israeli campaign is in Gaza. It started out, if you recall, with the goal of wanting to fully destroy Hama and eradicate it and all of that sort of thing. What I have just said, and I read the statement made by Mr. Netanyahu, was there'll be no ceasefire until the hostages are released. If we take this face value, and I think we need to.

We need to look for any opening that really could bring an end to this round of violence as soon as possible. There is a massive war of aggression taking place. It definitely needs to stop because with each passing minute, there are casualties, there are victims, and that's priority. Let's just take this face value. Readiness to stop or ceasefire or something if the hostages are released. Okay, how are the hostages going to be released while fire is still ongoing, while the guns are not silenced? It is very difficult. I think there may appear to be here a little bit of space. In fact, that's what I was really looking for when I wrote the piece I did.

I knew at the time Israel was not, and I said this explicitly in my piece, I didn't think my assessment was that Israel was in any mood to discuss this cease fire. Basically, I said, why not really start with this, release unconditionally of civilian prisoners or captives. I thought that that might carve just enough space for diplomacy to happen, to really work towards really bringing this war to an end. That's what I was looking for. Definitely, I would not say no to anything right now. [crosstalk]

Brian Lehrer: I'm going to replay that clip because it went by so fast. This was just one moment that really surprised me from the ABC interview, because it seemed to crack open a door. Again, I'm not sure if out of context, as you say, it really means precisely this, but I'm going to play this again. This is like a 6-second clip of Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Well, there'll be no general ceasefire in Gaza without the release of our hostages.

Brian Lehrer: Of course, the inverse of that is there might be a ceasefire with the general release of the hostages.

Salam Fayyad: I think that, and as I said, I don't think there's much space between what I said and what Mr. Netanyahu said on the face of it. All I'm going to say is, these things are mediated, these things happen through mediators, and Israel is connected, obviously, to mediators on this and they listen. If there is a deal like this, we may not be far.

What I'm really talking about, just to make it clear, is the need for there to be a ceasefire in order for the hostages to be released safely, in order to ensure safe passage. No. That's basically what diplomas do. If there is something that needs to be clarified, I think it ought to be immediately. I'm actually pleased that you replayed the script. I hope that it'll be acted on because the distance between what appears to be said and meant here and what I'm saying is not really unbridgeable. I think it is definitely well within what can be done.

Brian Lehrer: Now we're going to turn to the long-term, which is mostly what your article is about. Listeners, if you're just joining us, we can invite a few calls. We'll have time for just a few calls for the former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. As we've been trying to do here, let's try to go beyond accusing each side of being worse and engage and talk about solutions.

This can be from any point of view, whatever your point of view is, but the question for you callers is, what can come next to satisfy the aspirations and security needs of both peoples, or any specific questions you have for Salam Fayyad, given his background and current article in Foreign Affairs Magazine and he is currently a visiting scholar at Princeton with a blueprint for Peace Plan in Foreign Affairs Magazine, 212-433-WNYC call or text 212-433-9692.

Moving to the longer-term, a big question for Israel and the world is who governs Gaza once the Israeli military action presumably accomplishes its goals and the old Hamas leadership has gone from power? You write that it's doubtful that the Palestinian Authority, as currently configured, would be willing to shoulder that responsibility, but a reconfigured Palestinian Authority may offer the best option for the day after. Would you describe for our listeners who may be very unfamiliar with the Palestinian Authority, how it could be configured to take over Gaza and in the context of a revived two-state peace process?

Salam Fayyad: Yes, the main point here of emphasis is the political viability of the Palestinian Authority. It's not the technocratic aspect, the administrative aspects of what needs to be done. These are all important issues. It's a tall order to really assume that responsibility, but I'm talking about what my main focus, when I say reconfigured politically, because the Palestinian Authority has not had much of a presence or footprint in Gaza since 2007.

To think that as it stands today, given the massive weakness, that weakness it really ended up in over the years for the reasons I mentioned now and also in the articles I elaborated well. Given that, is it really realistic to expect Palestinian Authority that is this weak and lacking in public support to be in political terms in a position to assume this responsibility in the Gaza strip?

It is hard as it is for the Palestinian Authority to assume that responsibility in the West Bank where it exists. Actually, anyone would tell you, Brian, and the listeners, that the Palestinian Authority has not really had much of a presence or effective presence, has not been having one over past number of years for a variety of reasons. There's violence out there, and I remind your listeners up until this war started, up until October 7th and subsequently, there was a lot of speculation over the past year, more than one year that the third Intifada was in the offing, based on what was happening in the West Bank, not in Gaza.

What I'm talking about here are settler raids on Palestinians. When I'm talking about virtually nightly raids by the Israeli army in areas that are supposed to be under the purview of Palestinian Authority. All of these factors can reduce, diminish the political viability of Palestinian Authority. [crosstalk]

Brian Lehrer: For people who were paying attention earlier this year, which most people in this country were not, the talk in Israel was a fear of a new violent uprising from the West Bank because people were becoming so unhappy with the situation there that you were just describing, increasing encroachment by the settlement movement, primarily including violent attacks by settlers on Palestinians. Instead, it came from Gaza. Let me pause there for just a second. We're going to take a break here, and when we come back, we'll talk explicitly about your proposal in the Foreign Affairs article for what a new two-state solution peace process could look like.

Listeners, we'll take a few phone calls for the former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad. Stay with us.

[MUSIC - Marden Hill: Hijack]

Brian Lehrer: Brian Lehrer on WNYC as we continue with the former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad. He was Prime Minister from 2007 to 2013. He's now a visiting scholar at Princeton, and he has a peace plan proposal in an article in Foreign Affairs Magazine. The two-state solution peace process, Mr. Prime Minister, has, as you know, and as you write, been dead or marginalized for so long that there's more talk today of the two sides competing for one-state solutions, either Israel annexing the West Bank with no full citizenship rights for Palestinians there or from the other side, ending Israel as a Jewish state and trying to set up a non-sectarian democracy. Either of those proposals is considered a worst case solution by the other side. Can a two state solution become a central focus again?

Salam Fayyad: I think if a serious effort is made toward looking into why the process started in 1993 did not deliver. It's not really too difficult. When you really look at the trajectory of events over the past three decades, it's not hard to really isolate basic-- some of the issues are structural in nature. Some of them have to do with the fact that commitments under the agreement were not fulfilled. Those two issues can be addressed.

First, the structural component of this. Three decades into the peace process that started on a transactional basis, not on the basis of recognizing any of our natural rights as a people, proved to be a failure. Actually, past 1999, the promise of a state happening diminished rapidly, progressively, up to the point when in 2020, if you recall, then President Trump rolled out a peace plan that you could call a two-state solution, he called it a two-state solution, but the state that was on offer to Palestinians was basically nothing but leftovers.

70% of the West Bank, in terms of territory, that's what he was talking about, and importantly, no sovereignty whatsoever. That's what basically was on the offing. It was translated into a plan that was published in January of 2020. Clearly that falls way below our minimum expectations of peace process. Certainly, that's not what was on the mind of our leadership when they entered into Oslo in 1993. Given that, and given that anything, any form of Palestinian state that's going to emerge has turned out to be something that is going to really be handed to us like a handout, I think that fundamentally has to be addressed.

For many years, the current Israeli Prime Minister, actually, before the current government, is on record multiple times as having said that there is not going to be sovereignty in the area between River Jordan and Mediterranean, other than Israel.

Now, somebody who says that clearly is not accepting of the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state on the territory Israel occupied in 1967. That has to be addressed. I say, yes, we Palestinians ought to be ready to engage in a political process that could lead to the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state on the territory occupied in 1967, both in Gaza and the West Bank. We should definitely-- but provided that before we do that, it's not going to be an exercise in hitting the reset button. It should be preceded by a formal recognition of the government of Israel of our right to a state. If this may sound too much, if this sounds too much, it isn't. In 1993, the PLO acting on behalf of all Palestinians recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist peace and security.

Brian Lehrer: Let me jump in here for time, but I understand what you're saying, I think. You propose that Israel recognize as a principle, a sovereign Palestinian state on territory that is now occupied, like the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in principle back in the '90s, but of course, that ended without an agreement on details. How could a two-state peace process succeed today along the lines that you just laid out, which is going back in some measure to the pre-1967 borders?

It's even harder now because so many Israeli settlers have moved to the West Bank and the settler movement is strong in Israeli politics. Do you have a vision of the details of mutual separation for a two-state solution that the two sides might agree upon?

Salam Fayyad: It should be obvious from what I have to say in that article and repeated many times before, and what I can reaffirm now speaking to you, Brian, is that what I'm talking about is not in lieu of negotiations. To the contrary. I think we should be ready to engage in negotiations. All we need, given the failure over the past three decades, is to square that circle of recognition that was started in 1993, but it was not reciprocal. Obviously, it was not-- it's not symmetrical. We need that.

Given what you mentioned, settlement activity, continuing, and all of that sort of thing, and statements made repeatedly by many Israeli officials to the effect that not only are they not willing to entertain the idea of a Palestinian state on the territory Israel seized in 1967, but even some of them in the current government reject the idea of a Palestinian Authority continuing to exist. We have to really bring in the politics before we can go too far.

How can it really be possible for a representative of Palestinian people to engage in a political process against the backdrop of all that's being said to-- It's imminently logical for us to expect that, but that really is a segue to [unintelligible 00:25:24] negotiations over the state and all issues that were agreed to be negotiated to bring about an end to the Israeli occupation that began 1967. The other part of this political, that's [unintelligible 00:25:36]

Brian Lehrer: Go ahead, the other part.

Salam Fayyad: It does require a reconfiguration of the Palestinian representative. The PLO today is not the PLO that signed the Oslo Accords in 1993 in terms of its representational power and capacity. Outside of it, there is a significant chunk of Palestinian public. I'm not only talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad and similar factions, similarly minded factions, but the vast majority of our youth don't really believe anymore in the capacity of the platform the PLO has put itself on in '93 anymore. Clearly its representation and capacity has diminished.

What you really need to do, and this definitely is an important element in reconfiguring the PA itself, is to broaden the base of representation in the PLO and for that broader base, so it's more encompassing because in the end, representatives of Palestinians are going to sit on one side of the table, representatives of the Israeli government are going to sit on another side of the table. Those on the Israeli side are known, they are the Israeli government. On the Palestinian side, who is the representative?

Nominally, it's the PLO, but effectively, can the PLO without actually broadening its base of representation undertake any commitments of the kind that was undertaken back in 1993? The answer is no, politically. That is why I think it's important for us to really look at those issues carefully. None of this really should take that long period of time. Those ideas have been around for a long period of time, they were not adopted for a variety of reasons, least of which factional rivalries.

Brian Lehrer: Let me jump in again for time, and I think I hear you saying that the coalition that represents the Palestinians in any new two-state negotiation needs to be broader, meaning including groups maybe like Hamas that are more radical and rejectionist than your group. You write in your Foreign Affairs article that each side would make an ironclad pledge of nonviolence. Israel's position has long been that the Palestinian Authority can't guarantee Israeli security because groups like Hamas just won't accept Israel as a Jewish state and they'll keep launching terrorist attacks even if the Palestinian Authority opposes them, even if there's a two-state solution on paper in two actual states. How do you solve that?

Salam Fayyad: Yes, well, to respond directly to that point of concern, when Hamas is represented, Israel cannot have much faith in a commitment to nonviolence made by the PLO on behalf of all Palestinians. Then logically speaking, Israel should be less assured of the representational capacity, and the capacity to deliver of a Palestinian representative that does not include factions like Hamas. You see what I'm saying? If they are outside the tent, they are not subject to any commitments the PLO takes on their behalf. That's the difference.

Brian Lehrer: Not Hamas.

Salam Fayyad: I'm explicit on this. It's important.

Brian Lehrer: Let's take a phone call. Tom in Manhattan. You're on WNYC with former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Hi, Tom.

Tom: Hi, Brian. I've been listening to this and it sounds like a crazy merry-go-round for years and years and years. 100 years ago, the Zionists said, "Hey, let's start a Jewish state, something crazy." Why don't we just stop talking about a two-state solution and have a three-state solution? One is just Jews that want to be with Jews, one is just Arabs that want to be with Arabs, and then a state where Jews and Arabs want to live together in peace and happiness and let the haters stay in their areas, and let the other haters stay in their areas and have it protected by the UN.

Brian Lehrer: Yes, and Tom, I'm going to leave it there for Tom because we're going to lose the Prime Minister in a few minutes, but then you have three states to figure out what the borders are. Have you ever heard anything like that before, Prime Minister, anything there?

Salam Fayyad: The reality of what exists on the ground today, actually, is, well, there is the State of Israel, everybody knows it exists, and there is a state look-alike in the West Bank. That's the Palestinian Authority, and another state look-alike in Gaza under Hamas' control. If you really want actually think about it this way, there is a state within a state there that is basically the settlement enterprise of Israel in the West Bank. Obviously, I'm not advocating for a solution like this. I think it ought to be up to people to decide. I don't see, realistically speaking, an agreed solution viable anytime soon.

The ongoing war, if anything, makes that even more difficult, considering how much more difficult it is today than it was some years back and certainly before the current war and all. There is a lot to be done. What I'm really talking about is a transitional period, a multi-year transitional period bookended by national elections on our side, because I was beginning to say, Israel's representatives goes to polls, they have a government, it represents negotiations.

Now, we need to have the equivalent of this. We need to have a fully empowered representative Palestinian people. That can happen if A, that base of representation is broadened, and B, if this multi-year transitional period I'm talking about is bookended by national elections so people can choose leadership. Now, eventually, there's going to be a settlement one day, but I'm not really expecting that one day is around the corner.

Brian Lehrer: Right.

Salam Fayyad: It's going to take a long time, and then what people then settle on, they settle on. If it is agreed by definition, it's something that both sides will be willing to live with, and I'll just leave it at that.

Brian Lehrer: Will, in Jackson, New Jersey. Will, we've got about 20 seconds for your question. Do your best.

Will: Okay. Going back to the hostages and what was mentioned earlier, that Netanyahu gave some sort of concession that there would not be a ceasefire without the hostages returning, finding that the inverse would be true. What would be the motivation of Hamas not returning the hostages today to get some sort of pause of the violence and save so many lives?

Brian Lehrer: Yes, that's a good question, and conversely, what would be the motivation for Israel to engage in such a deal? Because then Hamas, which wants to destroy Israel, would continue to exist. I know we have a minute left, Prime Minister.

Salam Fayyad: Well, given all else that's been happening, it's worthwhile giving this a try. If in fact, I heard the Prime Minister of Israel correctly, again, this does not really strike me as something that's beyond what diplomats can do, what mediators can do. It definitely can be established whether or not there is serious to this. My hope is that a step like this, which is necessary, I was very clear in terms of where I stand on it myself, this issue.

There are some practical considerations, yes, but my hope was for that to lead to carving out just enough space for diplomas to really bring this to an end. That is doable. I think it's worthwhile giving it a try, considering all else, the structures that's been tried and continues to be tried.

Brian Lehrer: I know you have to go. Former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, now a visiting scholar at Princeton. Thank you so much for your time today. We really appreciate it.

Salam Fayyad: Thank you, Brian, very much for having me on. I appreciate it very much. Thank you.

Brian Lehrer: This was inspired by his article in Foreign Affairs Magazine called A Peace Plan for Gaza.

 

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