Why U.S. military bombings haven't stopped the global cocaine boom
Since last year, the U.S. military has killed 240 people from Latin America while bombing alleged drug smuggling boats.
With cocaine prices falling globally, whether the killings are deterring drug traffickers or just changing how drugs reach American streets.
Guests
Will Freeman, fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He researches drug trafficking and organized crime. He wrote the New Yorker article “An Ecuadorian Fishing Boat Disappears Amid Trump’s Strikes in the Pacific.”
Also Featured
Carl Latkin, professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Bakari Atiba, director of Community Engagement at Charm City Care Connection, a Baltimore nonprofit.
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Transcript of Full Broadcast
The version of our broadcast available at the top of this page and via podcast apps is a condensed version of the full show. You can listen to the full, unedited broadcast here:
Part I
MEGHNA CHAKRABARTI: Since September of last year, the U.S. military has launched more than 70 strikes against alleged drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, killing about 240 people. President Donald Trump has posted videos of many of these strikes showing small boats erupting in fireballs.
He spoke at a rally in South Carolina last month.
DONALD TRUMP: And don’t feel bad. When you see that, you shouldn’t feel bad because each one of those boats will kill 5 to 10,000 people, so you can’t feel that bad.
CHAKRABARTI: Despite repeated requests from Congress, the administration has not publicly provided evidence establishing who was aboard the targeted boats or what they were carrying.
In September of this year, Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights for the United Nations, warned that the strikes could constitute crimes against humanity. He described the killings as extrajudicial. Still, the Trump administration continues to celebrate the campaign. Trump joked about it at that same South Carolina rally.
TRUMP: The problem with it is it’s totally killed the fishing industry in the oceans and the Gulf because everybody’s afraid to go fishing. They’re afraid of being hit with a missile. So the fishing industry is dead, but so is the drug industry in terms of that. No, we brought it down.
CHAKRABARTI: Actual evidence of the American cocaine market tells a very different story.
An internal Drug Enforcement Administration assessment obtained by The Washington Post found that the strikes have done little to reduce the supply or price of cocaine in the United States. So what are these military strikes actually accomplishing? How much cocaine is currently available on American streets?
We’ll hear from one city about that one a bit later. But let’s start with Will Freeman. He’s a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he researches organized crime, and he recently wrote a piece published in The New Yorker titled An Ecuadorian Fishing Boat Disappears Amid Trump’s Strikes in the Pacific.
Will, welcome back to On Point.
WILL FREEMAN: Hi, Meghna. It’s good to be with you.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay. Before we get into sort of the policy details of Operation Southern Spear, as it’s called, I actually would love for you to start with where you started your New Yorker article, because I think it really brings to light at least some of the people who have been on these boats that have been struck by U.S. drones.
Can you tell us a little bit about Juan Carlos Valencia and the other folks on his boat?
FREEMAN: Sure, I can. So Juan Carlos Valencia is a fisherman from the small town of Jaramijó on the coast of Ecuador. And on January 13th, he set off with nine other crew he was the captain for a standard three-week fishing voyage.
They’d been going out together for years fishing for marlin, tuna, and shark and this was an entirely routine voyage. They took their 40-year-old long line fishing vessel, pretty small boat and set out. But what happened is over the next few days, they reported they were being followed by a white aircraft and by drones via a satellite phone to their families on shore.
And on January 20th Juan Carlos made a final call back to his father saying that things seemed normal. What happened a few moments later was two crew who had been off on a different skiff miles away from the mothership lying casting fishing line, they said that they saw a huge plume of black smoke where the Fiorella had last been. That was the last that anyone heard of these remaining eight men who were on board.
The two survivors were rescued, brought back to shore, and what followed was really disturbing. There was no attempt to search for this boat, no serious attempt by the Ecuadorian government. And over time it seemed that officials both there and in the United States were very nervous about what might be discovered if this case were really investigated.
Fast-forwarding to August, you had The New York Times and Washington Post actually confirm that the white plane that the crew members had described following them was in fact in the air. It had flown from a military base in El Salvador historically used by the CIA, and it had tracked the Fiorella over its final days.
So that’s what we know now. Tragically these eight men are still missing. I went to the town of Jaramijó. I met with their families in a small auditorium there. And you can just imagine the pain and anguish. This was after the crew had been missing at that point for four months with no word of them, and this was just a room of adults who were crying, kids trying to look after their younger siblings, toddlers, everyone holding up laminated photos of these missing men.
And at one point they swelled into a chorus just saying, “Bring them back. Bring them back.” And it’s always stuck with me.
CHAKRABARTI: We have some tape here of Secretary of State Marco Rubio talking about Operation Southern Spear. And he was actually in Ecuador in September, and here’s one of the things that he said.
MARCO RUBIO: Our goal is not to go after fishermen. Our goal is to go after drug traffickers.
CHAKRABARTI: So Will, how do we know for sure whether the crew of the Fiorella was or was not part of the drug trafficking or the drug trade coming out of Ecuador?
FREEMAN: We can’t know for certain, but there are things that made me believe with quite a bit of confidence that this was a false positive.
This was an incorrect target. This was not a boat involved in drugs, I believe. One reason is I was able to recover the GPS track for this boat going back three years. And what over that time is that the Fiorella was running completely standard fishing routes for the catch that it usually went after.
I asked multiple international fishing experts about this who know a lot about how these fleets usually move in the Eastern Pacific. It was not running the sort of strange, long, looping routes that sometimes small vessels do to bring cocaine or fuel to larger narco ships waiting offshore.
Also, of the crew, two had criminal records, but they were for failure to pay child support and for fishing in protected areas. So there was no kind of history of any kind of confirmed drug ties or time in prison for any of these men. Now, I do wanna say Jaramijó and other towns like it on the coast, they do live trapped between cocaine trafficking gangs and state crackdowns both from Ecuador and now from the United States.
So there really is a lot of drug trafficking in these areas, but obviously not everyone is involved, and some people resist joining this at great risk to themselves. They can be pressured sometimes. I even learned fishermen will have their motors stolen by gangs to force them into debt and basically put them in a financial situation where they’re more likely to work for the traffickers.
But in this case, the families continue to insist these men are innocent. And as you remarked at the top, we don’t have any confirmation from the Trump administration that any of these boats that have been hit, least of all the Fiorella, were actually carrying drugs.
CHAKRABARTI: Yeah. But as you report in your new story for The New Yorker a U.S. Navy official actually suggested to the families of these men that the men knew what they were getting themselves into, and quote, “They had to face the consequences.”
It seems as if since we cannot confirm … whether or not the crew of the Fiorella was involved in the drug trade, it is also true, though, as you report, that Jaramijó the port that they were coming out of, you say it has been transformed in the past 20 years by the drug trade.
What has that transformation been?
FREEMAN: That’s right. So just for some perspective here, this is a town of about 30,000 people on a little arid hill right next to the port city of Manta, a larger city in Ecuador. It’s a fairly poor, humble place. But you see a lot of houses that are half constructed and there’s a sense there’s some economic movement there.
It’s all, the whole town’s centered around a little artisanal fishing port where people have fished for generations. Actually, there, I met fishermen in the town who still knew how to navigate the open Pacific by the stars. That’s what a tradition there is in this part of Ecuador of navigation.
But that tragically made the same community a target for cocaine trafficking gangs and cartels. So going back to the kind of early, mid-2000s, you had a sustained effort by the United States to help Colombia shut down trafficking routes through its Pacific coast. What happened then was Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel increasingly moved to the coast of Ecuador.
It was this overlooked place. It really wasn’t a major trafficking route at the time. It was very quiet, very peaceful, and so no one suspected that they might go there. And you had towns like Jaramijó from the very beginning having these Sinaloa cartel representatives show up and hire, in some cases, fishermen to move cocaine for 20, $30,000 a trip.
But also, in some cases, force those who were reluctant. And for a number of years, that came with relatively little violence, but coming into the late 2010s and then finally the early 2020s the amount of cocaine moving through Ecuador was so much, it was so valuable, that you saw countrywide turf wars breaking out between different gang factions and criminal groups.
And in that context, the larger metro area of which Jaramijó is a part became actually one of the deadliest cities in the world. It was number six on a recent ranking of 2025, of the deadliest cities in the world per capita. It’s a place where, in Manta, for instance a mayor was recently assassinated.
You’ve had the prosecutor who was investigating the case of the Fiorella was herself killed, actually just a couple weeks after I had been in Jaramijó and had nearly met with her. And ordinary people suffer this violence constantly. Seven boat captains in the area have been assassinated in the last two years, people believe either for losing drug shipments or for refusing to cooperate with the traffickers.
And even something as ordinary as funerals for missing fishermen or for fishermen who’ve gone missing at sea, even these have become the site of shootouts between rival gangs.
CHAKRABARTI: Wow. So can we go so far as to assume, or let me just ask you when you, of course, tried to check with the Trump administration in terms of their logic, is it such that we know that there is a great deal of drug trafficking coming out of these Ecuadorian ports? And is it that the U.S. military, instead of … we know that instead of using conventional means such as interdicting the boats … they’re just presuming that if it’s coming out of those ports, the boat’s highly likely to be a, quote-unquote, “drug boat” and taking military action.
Now, I wanna say that we’ve done a show specifically on the legality of these moves by the Trump administration, so encourage people to listen to that, and we also talked to you before about Ecuador. But is that sort of the unspoken logic that the Trump administration is using? And we have about 30 seconds before our break, Will.
FREEMAN: Absolutely. There was actually a hearing with Senator Tim Kaine where he points out that although he’s not cleared to divulge the exact information, that among the targeting criteria for all these boat strikes, having drugs on board is actually not one of them. So very clearly, they’re just working with that assumption that if you leave from a certain part port, you are guilty.
You are a drug trafficker. And I think that’s the exact logic that led to the disappearance of these 8 men.
Part II
CHAKRABARTI: Will, I just want to play a little bit more from the Trump administration via the Secretary of State on their stated goals for Operation Southern Spear and why they think it’s so important. So here is Marco Rubio again in Ecuador in September.
RUBIO: These terrorist groups have to be dismantled, not just by blowing up their boats and taking their boats. They have to be dismantled financially. I don’t know if you guys fully comprehend how deeply rooted into societies these criminal bands have become. You had people in governments here that are complicit with them and what they were doing.
It’s illegal mining, but it goes all the way down to the street level: murder, extortion murder for hire you name it. These groups became more powerful than governments in many cases, and if you don’t confront these groups, they will eat these countries alive. It’s like a cancer that continues to grow until you don’t literally have a state anymore.
CHAKRABARTI: And then the Secretary of State also said that the U.S. is working with some regional governments.
RUBIO: We haven’t hidden the fact that we are going to go after narcotrafficking boats. We’ve been doing it now for over a year, and now the difference is that we’re doing it in collaboration and in cooperation with along, working alongside countries in the region, in their territorial waters.
And in fact, some of these countries are taking the strikes themselves.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay, Will, I wanted to ask you, again to get some context here, how much of the cocaine specifically that’s entering the United States is coming from right now from Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia?
FREEMAN: It’s difficult to say with exact precision because there’s also coca grown and cocaine produced in Peru and Bolivia.
But everything suggests that the lion’s share somewhere north of 80, 90% is coming from Colombia specifically, where the coca is largely grown and cocaine produced, and then routes that are trafficked. I would say Ecuador is substantially larger than Venezuela at this point. But it doesn’t just move on small boats.
It also moves in container ships on small aircraft, and over land once it reaches Central America and Mexico.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay. So then let us presume, this is a hypothetical, okay? That for a moment, every single one of the boats that the U.S. military has bombed since the start of Operation Southern Spear, hypothetically, if every single one of them was a drug boat, given the volume of cocaine that’s coming from these places, would those strikes have had a meaningful impact on reducing the kilos of coke entering the U.S.?
FREEMAN: I think at the margins, if you somehow could detect and stop every single small boat, yes, it would have an effect because this is an important route where you have the small boats from South America meeting up with larger ones that take kilos of cocaine to the shores of Central America and Mexico.
But what we know globally is that something like 70% of cocaine moves on container ships, so that’s become the lifeblood of a lot of these trafficking groups, which by the way, are supplying markets in Europe, which have become just as big as the United States and even further away.
So yeah, I think that even if the strategy were ruthlessly and fully successful, it wouldn’t end the cocaine market in the United States.
CHAKRABARTI: 70% of the cocaine is moved on container ships. That is something. And as far as I can tell, Will, we haven’t yet seen the U.S. military bomb a container ship.
FREEMAN: That’s right. And nor have we seen, from what I can tell, much pressure on supposed allies of ours, like the right-wing Daniel Noboa government in Ecuador, to majorly clean up their ports, which are really, when Marco Rubio there, you heard him talking about what enables these criminal groups to grow, it’s interesting that he didn’t mention that.
But ports where scanners are constantly tampered with or never arrive, ports where you have workers without sufficient protection who are being threatened or bribed by these groups to allow them to smuggle cocaine aboard vessels, that’s more significant financially for them than access to fishing communities and their small boats in places like Jaramijó.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay. So I appreciate all that background because it helps us get a better handle on how to assess claims coming out of the administration, right? You heard at the top of the show the clips from the president, who says, Operation Southern Spear and those boat bombings have, quote, “brought down the drug industry.”
That’s what the president says. But Will, as other members of his administration are basically saying the exact opposite, because federal Drug Enforcement Administration officials have been seeing something completely different around the country right now.
CHAKRABARTI: So take a second with me to listen to Frank Tarentino with the DEA in New York, Colin Dickey with the DEA in St. Louis, Missouri, Rafael Mattei with the DEA in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Miles Aley with the DEA in Miami.
We have seen a dramatic increase in cocaine smuggled into the United States. About 96% of that cocaine comes out of Colombia.
We’re seizing more cocaine. At the end of the day, they don’t care about who’s dying. They want to get as much drugs in the United States as possible.
This is material, that’s inventory that’s there, so they’re lowering the prices, and they’re trying to move it. So yeah, we are seeing it make a comeback up to our area.
Our agents are buying kilos of cocaine from these organizations, 10 to $13,000 a kilo. That’s much lower than what we’re used to. It’s the lowest I’ve seen during my 22-year career.
CHAKRABARTI: So in fact, these DEA agents are saying that the cocaine market in the U.S. is as robust as ever. They’re seizing even more cocaine trying to come into the United States, and that last voice you heard, Miles Aley with the DEA in Miami, he’s really taken aback because historically, a kilo of cocaine has cost between 22 to $25,000.
So prices right now are up to $15,000 per kilo cheaper, showing just how much the cocaine supply has increased. So really what we want to know is what does that mean for the people who are caught up in the drug trade? So Bakari Atiba is the director of community engagement at Charm City Care Connection in Baltimore, Maryland.
The organization runs a drop-in center offering meals, medicine, showers, and other services.
ATIBA: Our doors are open to everyone. However, our services are particularly geared towards people who are actively in drug use and struggling with substance use disorder, and our demographic, 60% of the clients we serve are African American males between the ages of 48, 50 up, right?
And that is the population that’s also been most vulnerable in Baltimore City to overdose.
CHAKRABARTI: Bakari says in the past two years, which would be the same amount of time that Operation Southern Spear has been in operation, Charm City has seen about a 15 to 20% increase in clients coming through his doors.
His organization also tests street drugs, and while the cocaine supply is usually pure, recent results are raising concerns.
ATIBA: Some of the samples we’ve been testing have been also testing positive for fentanyl. And some of our participants have spoken about purchasing cocaine on the street and using it, and it putting them to sleep instead of keeping them up, right?
And that’s different. That’s changed over the last year, because we didn’t really hear about that too much before.
CHAKRABARTI: Even in minuscule amounts, fentanyl can be deadly. Last year, one suspected bad cocaine batch sent 27 people to local hospitals in just a single day. Historically, Baltimore has been a major entry point for cocaine shipped from the Caribbean.
We asked Bakari if the dealers he speaks with have been impacted by the U.S. military strikes on those alleged Latin American drug boats, and he says, “Not really.”
ATIBA: It’s so far out of our purview. I know it has some type of impact. But we don’t know it, and we don’t see it, so we just know what we see on a day-to-day basis, and that stays consistent regardless of what’s going on with politics and government and the military.
CHAKRABARTI: So why doesn’t destroying boats change much on the ground? For more than 30 years, Carl Latkin has studied drug use at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, also in Baltimore. And he says even if you assume all those boats the military blows up have cocaine on board, like we did before, it would not make a dent in the supply.
CARL LATKIN: You’re dealing with these large cartels, these multi-billion-dollar cartels that have lots of shipping routes, lots of options. So I would think that unless you had an international concerted effort where you’re working closely with your allies, it’s unlikely that you’re gonna find from these relatively small, albeit morally abhorrent boat strikes, that you’re really gonna find a change in the market.
CHAKRABARTI: Meanwhile, the Trump administration has also restricted federal support for drug overdose prevention. That is something Carl says could make a difference on the demand side of drug abuse prevention.
LATKIN: We know how to address these problems, and we’re not following evidence-based approaches to treating this, this public health issue.
So yeah, it’s not just these are ineffective. They’re pulling resources away from effective programs. You get headlines for the pyrotechnics, but they’re not making America a healthier place.
CHAKRABARTI: Bakari Atiba at Charm City Care Connection agrees. His organization relies mostly on local funding.
ATIBA: The prevalence of drugs in the community is just a symptom of other problems that really need to be addressed.
And just in our experience, the majority of the people that we serve, yeah, they might have drug use disorder issues, but they’re also, like 90% of them are homeless or unstably housed, right? And that’s really one of the biggest problems. If anything people just need somewhere to go. And somewhere to be safe where they can also access wraparound services, right?
Because it’s hard to think about going in recovery and things of that nature when every other part of your life is falling apart.
CHAKRABARTI: So that’s Bakari Atiba, community outreach coordinator for Charm City Care Connection in Baltimore. You also heard from Carl Latkin at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
So Will, I wanna lean on your research regarding drug trafficking and organized crime and ask you, like if, how do you compare the robustness of the cocaine market right now in the United States in comparison to, say, opioids, meth, or even just fentanyl?
FREEMAN: It’s interesting. You’ve seen a shift over time, for sure, since the mid-late 2000s.
Until then, the United States was, without question, the largest cocaine market in the world, and it was responsible, the consumers here were responsible for a lot of the death, destruction, and corruption in Latin America as a result. But after that, you have a shift where cocaine consumption measured using traces of cocaine in wastewater, various cities, the UN’s been doing this for years, consumption in the U.S. plateaued more or less, whereas in Europe it just exploded.
And now Europe is as large or some believe even larger of a market than the United States. So that’s been the real change over the last few years, whereas in the United States you’ve had this shift towards opioids, and I think that’s driven by a few factors. One is the Purdue pharma firm and the Sackler family behind it for years engaged in organized crime.
They flooded communities with prescription opioids, made as much as a quarter of their revenue off of the diversion of those pills to black markets, so essentially through indirectly supplying drug dealers. And it took this entire saga of years and years to finally hold anyone accountable for this.
So that really created a group of people who were addicted to opioids and would eventually, when they could no longer get those pills because of tighter restrictions, would shift towards fentanyl, heroin, et cetera. And it produced or contributed to a big shift in how and people in the U.S. consume drugs, what drugs they’re consuming.
So we’ve seen this kind of, this global reorganization of who’s consuming what, and the consequences in Latin America have been massive.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay, wait, so help me understand what you’re saying. Are you saying that because of the shift, excuse me, to opioids, that’s actually, I don’t know, reduced the number of cocaine users in the United States, and therefore there’s this seeming glut right now in the availability of cocaine and the drop in the per kilo price? I’m confused.
FREEMAN: Yeah, no it makes sense, right? So we do see that there’s been a plateau in consumption. Why then is there a glut? That’s a good question. I think that just has to do with the extraordinary amounts being produced in Colombia over the last decade.
You have had in Colombia, a ninefold increase in coca production according to researchers from the University EAFIT in Medellin from 2014 to 2023. This is unprecedented. There’s more cocaine being produced now in Colombia by many times than during the days of Pablo Escobar. So that has to go somewhere, right? And that for me it makes sense why even as they’re pushing a lot of that into the European market and these other new global markets, you’d still have large volumes arriving to the United States, and actually at lower prices because you have so much product to offload.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay, so in that case, you have this huge surge in production from Colombia. And at the same time, Operation Southern Spear, as we seem to have established, even if it were perfectly successful, would only have an impact on this market at the margins. I’ve also been reading reporting on the fact that, okay, let’s acknowledge that Operation Southern Spear is actually putting some pressure at least on that one route of cocaine from the Caribbean into the United States. But, these are narco traffickers and cartels are incredibly sophisticated businesses, right? I don’t imagine that they’re not rebounding in terms of finding other new creative means to get cocaine into the United States.
FREEMAN: Absolutely. I can provide an example.
What they’re increasingly doing when they are still using the small boats is just avoiding international waters, where from what we know, almost all or all of these strikes have occurred. So just as one example, you’ve had a huge increase what I’ve heard from sources in small boat traffic from Venezuela to Trinidad and Tobago because there’s almost no international waters between those two countries.
If you’ve ever seen a map of Trinidad, it’s right off the coast of Venezuela, so there’s no, you don’t have to skirt across a large open space where a strike could occur. So I think that’ll just, it shows you right there, even if this is effective at driving all the small boats out of international waters and stopping those routes they’re going to adjust and adapt, and they already have.
CHAKRABARTI: And haven’t they always been like this in the repeated sort of cycle after cycle of major amplifications of anti-drug trade efforts coming out of the United States?
FREEMAN: That’s right. There’s always been adaptation, and over the long run, over the last 40, 50 years, there’s been steady expansion of the global cocaine trade.
However, I will say that it’s different from saying that what the United States does and what partners in the region do just simply doesn’t matter. And I think that’s not quite true either. So I mentioned earlier that there’s been this boom in supply from Colombia in the last 10 years. Why is that?
It’s because starting around 2013, ’14, ’15, Colombia leaned away from its most aggressive coca eradication efforts for some good reasons. There were disastrous secondhand health consequences. They were negotiating a peace deal with an armed group that required them to make some concessions at the margins.
But those policy changes and the U.S. stepping away from doing so much to finance and pressure eradication, it did create the conditions for this supply boom afterwards. It’s not as simple as saying everything tried has been ineffective, but at best, what the U.S. and its partners have been able to do is to freeze things in place for a number of years.
They’ve never really been able to shrink or dismantle the cocaine trade.
Part III
CHAKRABARTI: Will it’s almost as if you could see into the future because in the last segment you ended with talking about previous U.S. attempts to put a stop or significantly depress the amount of cocaine coming out of Central and South America. And your point is an important one because, yes, previous attempts have been very effective, but they have been long, and they have been expensive.
And once the United States pulls back from those efforts, as you said, the cartels just come surging back. So I want to go through a little bit of the history of Plan Colombia, and I know you know it well, but I think it’s important to spend some time going through it for listeners. So sit back with me, and then let’s just go through this because in the year 2000, President Bill Clinton committed the U.S. to an ambitious campaign that was called Plan Colombia.
Now, the situation in Colombia at the time was very complicated. Cocaine trafficking was playing a significant role in the decades-long Colombian civil war, and Plan Colombia was a joint operation between the Clinton administration and the government of then Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango.
And from the outset it had one goal, and that was to try to help end the Colombian civil war, meaning, yes, the U.S. was directly intervening on behalf of the Colombian government against narco traffickers and left-wing insurgents, the largest group of which was called the FARC. Plan Colombia had two tactics: an anti-cocaine strategy and increased support, American support, for the Colombian military.
Their purpose is to reduce the drug trade that aggravates every problem Colombia faces and exports chaos to the world, including the United States. I reject the idea that we must choose between supporting peace or fighting drugs. We can do both. Indeed, to succeed, we must do both.
CHAKRABARTI: And over the next 15 years, the U.S. spent more than $10 billion on Plan Colombia and related programs.
Presidents Bush and Obama continued the campaign, and as Will had said earlier, in 2016, the Colombian government and FARC guerrillas signed a peace agreement, bringing the civil war mostly to an end. But the half-century-long conflict left more than 25,000 Colombians disappeared, 220,000 dead, and 5.7 million displaced.
And here’s where the cocaine trade comes in, because that trade itself, the U.S.-funded Plan Colombia was in a sense, almost working against the drug interdiction plans. That might make, not make much sense, but here’s what I’m talking about. It is true that cocaine trafficking funded the FARC rebels and right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia.
However, the first Colombian paramilitary groups were organized on the recommendation of U.S. counterinsurgency advisors as far back as the Cold War, and those armed militias evolved to include forces protecting Colombian landowners, multinational corporations, and drug cartels.
Moreover, the U.S., international human rights organizations, and the UN had all documented secretive alliances between the narco-trafficking paramilitary groups and the official Colombian military, which was receiving more than half a billion dollars in American aid through Plan Colombia.
Or, as a 2012 report from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists noted, quote, “In other words, the United States is backing the Colombian military, which has collaborated with rightist paramilitaries involved in the drug trade, in its fight against leftist FARC guerrillas because of their involvement in the drug trade,” end quote.
Okay, so that is why, or one of the reasons why, cocaine production proved much harder to stop than intended during Plan Colombia. In 2011, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy did claim that Colombian pure cocaine production had fallen almost 25% from 2010 to 2011 alone, and that was after even more precipitous declines in the years prior.
But a report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime released around the same time found that Colombia’s cocaine production had fallen by barely 1%. So why was it hard to get exact figures? By one measure, Plan Colombia was eradicating cocaine at its source via massive aerial herbicide spraying programs over Colombia’s coca fields.
In 2007, a Colombian farmer told NPR what happened after the planes left.
You try to save what you can. Imagine, this is a cocalero zone. Here the people don’t have anything else to live on, so if they fumigate, two or three months later, people are planting again.
CHAKRABARTI: By 2006, the United States government estimated that coca cultivation in Colombia had actually increased by 15% since Plan Colombia began.
Miles Frechette, a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, spoke to NPR in 2007.
Eradication has fallen flat on its face. We’ve discovered, and it’s right in the reports by the State Department and ONDCP, that after five years of Plan Colombia, the amount of acreage under cultivation for coca is the same as it was five years ago.
CHAKRABARTI: And moving to more present times, in 2024, a UN survey found a record 645,000 acres of coca under cultivation in Colombia. The DEA says 84% of the cocaine it samples analyzed from U.S. seizures in 2024 originated in Colombia.
So Will, that is an in-depth look at a very complicated relationship between the U.S. and Colombia, but I wonder if thematically, what lessons would you draw from that regarding and do they link to the Trump administration’s, kind of, smaller scale attempts to Operation Southern Spear?
FREEMAN: One lesson is and just to come back to a theme I mentioned earlier, but it’s the idea that at great expense, right, billions and billions of dollars over more than a decade, what the U.S. was able to do with Colombia and with governments that were genuinely trying to get this supply question under control was at most freeze it where it was or diminish it very marginally.
And what you saw afterward was a drawback on both sides. Plan Colombia ending, the Colombian government shifting to a different policy, and the subsequent expansion. And I think it’s a tragic choice that Colombia and other countries in Latin America have been forced into by both global demand for cocaine and by its prohibition. Which is that they can either spend all these resources and lives freezing the economy where it is, but knowing they’re still going to have to live with its violence and corruption in some amount, or they can step back and allow it to operate freely, which itself brings terrible consequences.
There’s all this violence we’ve seen in Ecuador since. All the new cocaine routes expanding as this glut has surged across the region. So to put it crudely, damned if you do, damned if you don’t. And it gets to, I think, a bigger question of whether or not Latin American states can really manage to live with this economy as long as it remains illegal, right?
Because again, it’s the illegality of cocaine that makes it so profitable. It’s not that it’s extremely expensive to grow coca leaves it’s very cheap, but it’s that it takes so much work and ingenuity to smuggle this product across so many borders and move it internationally, that’s where the money comes from.
Yeah, I think it just it shows the bind that that Colombia’s in and by some extension, the United States is in with Colombia.
CHAKRABARTI: This always comes back to a set of very large questions. One of them, one of them is what you just said, the consequences of illegality versus legalizing various forms of drugs. Then there’s also the constant conversation around instead of trying to keep drugs out of the United States, should the U.S. be using its considerable, sort of resources and hemispheric influence to develop, help countries internally develop their economies such that the drug trade becomes less attractive, right?
As a market because the economy of places like Ecuador and Colombia is healthier on its own. We can’t really get too deep conversation on those big picture questions. But I do want to again ask you, say the United States, and at least under this administration it seems like this is where their priorities are, really just focuses on keeping cocaine out of America, right?
That’s just, like, where we wanna spend all our money. Operation Southern Spear isn’t doing it, and given, as you said, the global nature of the trade, where would you suggest that the Trump administration focuses its effort, focuses its money, or also the U.S. military?
So assuming that they’re not going to address demand in the United States, or Europe or try to dismantle the trafficking networks that operate here, by the way, distributing all this we haven’t even discussed that, right? But there’s also, of course large drug trafficking networks in the U.S. and interestingly, drug prosecutions have been dropping domestically under this administration. But in terms of what could they do regionally that would be smarter and more systematic than just sinking innocent fishing boats like the Fiorella? I think one, they could be focused on supply where it matters.
And here’s an interesting shift we haven’t yet discussed, but over the last 10 years, much of the cocaine production has been shifting to these border enclaves between Colombia and Ecuador and Colombia and Venezuela that are almost like coca factory farms. So don’t think about the small farmer we just heard of, but think about an organized crime-run enclave that is producing so much cocaine that actually prices are falling for small farmers elsewhere in the country, what they can sell for.
So I think that there is a need to work with Colombia and Venezuela’s government to go after and to eradicate those, the kind of industrial scale operations. You’re not going to really weaken, you’re gonna not even gonna be able to return to where you were before unless you try to suppress that supply from those places.
Second, I would say you need to look seriously at police, prisons, and prosecutors in Latin America. Now, this administration has taken a kind of very jaded, cynical approach that we spent on these things for years, and it didn’t achieve everything we wanted, so we’re going to essentially cut away that funding and just rely on militaries.
But at the end of the day, militaries are not investigative bodies. They’re not going to be able to map out criminal organizations, go after their mid and upper-level operators, create costs and consequences for politicians and businesspeople who collaborate with them in these countries. All they’re going to be able to do is go after generally the lowest rung of these organizations, the most vulnerable, exposed people who are ultimately the most replaceable.
So I think a smart Trump administration approach would be to restore and seriously expand training efforts for police in the region so that they do real investigations, not just patrols and sweeps of the easiest to catch people. Work on prison reform. Latin America’s prisons aren’t a meaningful deterrent to crime because so many of them are controlled by crime themselves.
They’re overcrowded. There are long sentences, paradoxically, for low-level offenders. Often high-level crime bosses are able to bribe their way out or get out through different due process guarantees. And then finally, prosecutors and judges. Speaking of Ecuador again, 26 prosecutors, judges, and justice operators have been killed in Ecuador since 2020.
26 just since 2020. That speaks to the lack of protection that justice officials are often operating with in Latin American countries. So what could the U.S. do to make sure its partners and allies are providing that? So just to zoom out, I think again, police, prosecutors, prisons, going after these coca factory farms, all that is key.
And I’d add one more thing, which is trying to be consistent in our policies. And there have been some glaring inconsistencies in the Trump sort of war on drugs 2.0. One, pardoning Honduras’s ex-president Juan Orlando Hernández, who was serving a cocaine trafficking sentence.
Pretty glaringly inconsistent. And second, this sort of bear hug Donald Trump has given to Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela, who’s been under DEA investigation for a number of years and whose government is very much bound up with drug trafficking and other organized crime.
So it’s not to say you can always choose your partners and work with only the cleanest people available, right?
You may need to be pragmatic, but that it’s one thing to work with partners and pressure them on these issues at the same time, and another is to release a convicted narco president from prison. So I think that limiting that kind of, those glaring inconsistencies would also be very important if this administration were serious about really tackling this problem.
CHAKRABARTI: All the solutions that you just offered, I will note sarcastically that none of them produce grainy crosshairs video that a president can post on his social media accounts. But they also require efforts that cross administrations. So I think that’s the other thing, because you can’t just spend a couple of years protecting or increasing prosecutions in Latin America, and then, as we saw with Plan Colombia, tamp down or draw down those efforts.
This is gonna take decades maybe, if not more, which makes it politically challenging in the United States. But we have only just a couple minutes left, Will, and since you said we hadn’t talked about it, I would love to hear your thoughts about the internal drug trade within the United States, because the way you talked about it made it sound like it actually plays a significant role in the overall picture we’re speaking of.
FREEMAN: Yeah, interesting, just to come back to cocaine, what we know about cocaine is the markups you’re able to charge, they increase as you get closer to the consumer.
Many experts actually believe that most of the money made off of cocaine sales ends up, remains with sellers in the U.S. But where does that money go? We don’t know. That’s not something that the U.S. government tends to systematically investigate. There have been periodic busts of major banks like HSBC for laundering huge amounts of drug money, or money that they should have known came from drugs and not catching it.
But I think this is actually something we know less about than drug trafficking in Latin America and there’s a reason for that. Now, I will say, I don’t think that we have the equivalent of something like the Sinaloa cartel at that scale operating in the U.S. Our drug, the drug distributors here and the networks are much more decentralized.
They don’t have the same armed power to intimidate the state or govern whole communities. But they’re certainly present, and I think it reaches a really uncomfortable tension, which is that many people I think rightly criticize mass incarceration and the effect the war on drugs has had here.
But and I don’t want to justify this, but if you also don’t have a prosecutorial strategy to go after the drug distributors in the U.S., you’re essentially asking Latin America to do all of this dirty work of trying to suppress this trade, and you’re not fulfilling the end of the bargain here at trying to weaken the market on our own turf.
And I think that’s a, it’s a sort of an inconsistency. Again, we’ve asked Latin America to live with for many years.
This article was originally published on WBUR.org.


