The future of the American military in the Middle East
Blown out buildings. Destroyed aircraft. Exploded munitions. Iran has done massive damage to the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf. A close look into how much of the U.S. military presence is destroyed.
Guests
W.J. Hennigan, opinion correspondent for The New York Times, specializing in U.S. military, foreign policy and armed conflict. Author of the op-ed “Iran Exposed How Vulnerable Our Bases Are.”
Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Co-chair of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy. Author of the report “Estimating Wartime Damage to U.S. Military Bases in the Middle East as Part of Operation Epic Fury.”
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Transcript of Full Broadcast
The version of our broadcast available at the top of this page and via podcast apps is a condensed version of the full show. You can listen to the full, unedited broadcast here:
Part I
MEGHNA CHAKRABARTI: On the night of February 28th, emergency warning sirens broke the desert silence at the Al Udeid U.S. Air Base southwest of Doha in Qatar.
The base was under attack from Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. In a video circulated online after the attack, you can hear U.S. service members cheer on, with plenty of expletives, cheering on defense and interceptors launched to protect the base.
Al Udeid is the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East. Built by the Qataris in 1996 at a cost of $1 billion dollars, it is a hugely valuable strategic asset jointly operated by the U.S., Qatar, and the UK. Approximately 10,000 personnel are stationed there on average. That night, the U.S. fired multiple defensive measures to thwart the Iranian attack.
The interceptors failed. An Iranian missile slammed into the base. Just before the video ends, troops are assessing the damage. “I need a head count,” you hear the soldier saying there. The Al Udeid Air Base is home to the Combined Air Operations Center, a critical staging center for U.S. military operations throughout the Middle East, including the entirety of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
Iran’s missile attacks on February 28th destroyed the Combined Air Operations Center, one of the most strategically significant disruptions to U.S. command and control operations in the Middle East since 2001. Here’s the thing, the military already knew about Al-Udeid’s vulnerabilities. In June of last year, Iran launched missile strikes against the base after the U.S. attacked Iranian nuclear facilities.
At least one Iranian missile hit the base, and again, that was last year. This year, Al Udeid is not the only base that suffered significant damage since the U.S. and Israel started the war in Iran. The scale of the damage is enormous and getting larger. In fact, according to some reporting, more than a dozen U.S. bases in the region may now be uninhabitable.
W.J. Hennigan is with The New York Times, where he frequently writes on the U.S. military, foreign policy, and armed conflict. His recent piece is headlined Iran Exposed How Vulnerable Our Bases Are, and he joins us now from Annapolis, Maryland. Bill, welcome to On Point.
W.J. HENNIGAN: Hey, Meghna. Thanks for having me.
CHAKRABARTI: So you’ve been to the Al Udeid Air Base.
Before we talk about the damage that happened there, can you describe a little bit of sort of what it’s like on a, quote-unquote, “normal day?” It’s basically a small city, isn’t it?
HENNIGAN: Al Udeid is, it’s the largest military installation in the Middle East, as you said. It has, restaurants and, gyms and all the things that you might imagine that are necessary for service members there.
But in the middle of the base is the Combined Air Operations Center, the CAOC, as it’s called, and it’s ringed by razor wire, and it’s bristling with antennas, and to see it it’s windowless, but to think about it, it’s a mini basketball arena, as I say it has no windows, but it’s multi-structured. And inside there it’s like going to NASA’s mission control center in Houston, right? Where there’s IMAX screens with different imagery from around the Middle East of maps and aircraft locations and live video feeds from drones, and then there are analysts that are sitting at banks of row after row of glowing computer screens watching it all unfold.
CHAKRABARTI: So that’s a really good description and makes, it helps make a lot of sense out of why the CAOC there at the base was basically the nerve center of air operations for the United States across the Middle East. And I wanted to make a note, particularly in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars since that was such an intense, multi-decade period of time.
So you’ve been there since the February 28th attacks, that Iranian missiles tried to rain down on Al Udeid. Do you know if the CAOC was actually hit directly or nearby?
HENNIGAN: I haven’t been to Qatar since the attacks, no. I haven’t been. But what we do know is that the base was hit, that they have taken all of the personnel that operate in the CAOC and have moved that to a base here in the United States instead.
You can imagine all the millions, hundreds of millions of dollars that was poured into this facility for this very specific mission. And as you point out it was the nerve center for Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-ISIS fight in Syria as well. And it’s increased in importance because we don’t, the United States is more reticent to put service members boots on the ground, so to speak. And so we rely on air power more than ever to conduct our conflicts, and now this facility is a husk of itself. What we do know about the damage that has been done, because the transparency from this administration is woeful is that facility is not being, no longer being manned.
But we don’t know the extent to which it’s been damaged.
CHAKRABARTI: It’s no longer being manned. Okay. So Bill Hennigan, hang on here for just a second because I want to bring Mackenzie Eaglen into the conversation. Mackenzie is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and co-chair of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy.
And her report, actually published earlier this year, is titled Estimating Wartime Damage to U.S. Military Bases in the Middle East as Part of Operation Epic Fury. Mackenzie, welcome to On Point.
MACKENZIE EAGLEN: Thank you, Meghna.
CHAKRABARTI: So I was wondering if you could actually help us get some numbers out here on the table, because I’ve been having a hard time pinpointing, or pinning down, I should say, exactly how many U.S. military facilities Iran has successfully damaged.
We’ll talk about the scale of damage a little bit later, but do you have a number? What estimate would you give?
EAGLEN: We do have a number, although it, as has already been alluded to, it’s difficult to get credible information for a variety of reasons. But AEI’s analysis using a variety of methodologies we can walk through later, we estimate, over a dozen U.S. bases have sustained serious damage across the Middle East.
About 250 structures destroyed or damaged pretty severely, at a cost of at least $10 billion to date.
CHAKRABARTI: Wow, okay. So pretty significantly. What does that mean in terms of damage? How would we describe the scale, then?
EAGLEN: So the targets were precise. But as importantly, and again, has been alluded to, they were vital to operations.
So what we saw Iran systematically do was first take out our military’s eyes and ears on the ground to protect our troops and then our bases. So they were very smart and calculated in a way I think perhaps, I don’t know, maybe we underestimated. When you take out a radar, part of a functioning piece of a radar, or you take out a fuel bladder to keep the aircraft running, you take out warehouses where we have very sensitive systems equipment monitoring, right?
For basically for spying. Hangars where you store the aircraft. These types of attacks then create a slower response time by our own military, and at many of these bases, they lacked, they had some missile protection, but in large part they lacked drone protection, and so then they were even more vulnerable.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay. I want to come back to that because that’s really important, especially given what I had mentioned earlier that in last year, the summer of last year, Iran actually did successfully hit at least Al Udeid once. So that was a year ago we’re talking about here. But Bill Hennigan, let me ask you about what Mackenzie said regarding the scale of the damage, and specifically the strategic approach that Iran seems to have taken, because to back up what Mackenzie’s saying, I was just looking at a report out of the Associated Press that came out on October 31st, so just 10 days ago.
And the AP reported that looking at satellite imagery of the damage that has been done by Iran and the pattern and time at which various buildings were destroyed, like Mackenzie said, it looked like, it looks like Iran absolutely knew where to focus on early warning systems, taking those out first on U.S. bases before then expanding their attacks on aircraft and buildings.
Bill Hennigan, what does that tell you?
HENNINGAN: This is the sort of thing that you’d expect from a military force with intelligence. These bases are not a secret, right? They are sprawling facilities. They have millions and millions of dollars worth of equipment on them.
And to the point they’ve hit … Al Udeid is the Air Force’s headquarters in the Middle East. Then in Kuwait, we have the Army’s headquarters for the Middle East, and in Bahrain, we have the Navy’s headquarter for the Middle East, and all of these bases are hit and all of them have had personnel removed from them because they know that they’re targets and they know that they’re vulnerable.
CHAKRABARTI: Interesting. So you mentioned Kuwait. I’m looking here at again, the AP’s report, and they have satellite imagery from the Ali al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait on February 26th and then later this summer, and the precision of the Iranian strikes on places where aircraft hangars and early detection systems were housed is actually quite remarkable.
So when we come back, I wanna talk to you both about where the Iranians may be getting this intelligence from.
Part II
CHAKRABARTI: Here’s Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth responding this past spring to reports of attacks on bases and also about the loss of U.S. service member lives.
HEGSETH: You have air defenses, and the lot’s coming in, and you hit most of it, and we absolutely do. We have incredible air defenders. Every once in a while, you might have one, unfortunately, we call it a squirter, that makes its way through. And in that particular case it happened to hit a tactical operations center that was fortified, but these are powerful weapons.
So we certainly will do, as I said, moments like that as we remember them and we take care of them and take care of their families, only stiffen our resolve to ensure that we do this properly.
CHAKRABARTI: I’m joined today by W.J. Hennigan. He is an opinion correspondent for The New York Times. He specializes in covering the U.S. military and foreign policy.
He’s written about this in an op-ed titled Iran Exposed How Vulnerable Our Bases Are. Mackenzie Eaglen also joins us. She’s a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she wrote a report titled Estimating Wartime Damage to U.S. Military Bases in the Middle East as part of Operation Epic Fury.
Mackenzie, you wrote your report back in April, right? And here we are in November talking about it, because I feel like publicly there’s been a slow drip of information. What made you want to actually do a closer analysis this past spring?
EAGLEN: It was really strange to me, the level of attacks, I think CENTCOM reported 6,000 strikes or something in the opening week or two of Epic Fury, and they had put a cost estimate on it of $11 billion.
And those are eye-watering numbers for sure, but it was trickling out through credible open-source intelligence as well as soldier videos, the kinds of which you have referenced, which Central Command later asked soldiers to stop posting. There was a variety of credible information, including in foreign media outlets like Italian news media, showing the extent of the damage, but not here. And so in America, and I thought it was pretty strange because we need to be, one, straightforward about what’s happening to U.S. service members.
There are families, in many cases, forward stationed with these troops abroad. And to talk about the extent of the damage and our preparedness so that you can, so that Congress, who has to pay for all this, the taxpayer funded efforts and determine whether the U.S. military, adjusted quickly enough, appropriately enough, where are we lacking, like base drone defense and then just have that honest conversation with the American people as well as those in uniform.
And there wasn’t a single discussion anywhere, not in the news and not at other think tanks or other organizations. So I just thought it was really strange. And so we were the first mover of this kind of research, and then it, I think, opened the floodgates for others to start talking about it, putting their own satellite imagery analysis onto the problem and multiple different others piling on, which is great, but still, we need more from the United States government on these questions.
CHAKRABARTI: Okay. Point well taken. So speaking of how service members had taken to talking to members of the media in order to get more information out in September, CBS correspondent Jonah Kaplan received some more photos and videos supplied to him by active service members, and he described some of those images on CBS News.
JONAH KAPLAN: You’re gonna see these vehicles that clearly show damage, and you’re just gonna see a lot of charred debris. These ballistic missiles from Iran, these drones, which service members have told me are really compared to IEDs in the sky, they are really destroying and making a big mess. And you’re talking about assets, whatever equipment was in those buildings. Of course, life is the most irreplaceable commodity. There are 18 soldiers who have lost their lives, been killed, six of them in one such attack at the Port of Shuaiba at the beginning of the war. Lives cannot be replaced. Equipment can, but that’s a lot of taxpayer dollars.
CHAKRABARTI: It’s interesting because in another CBS report, a soldier told CBS News that it felt like being on base during those attacks felt like just standing there looking up into the sky and being punched in the face.
Now, you heard Jonah Kaplan mention the Port of Shuaiba. In March, that’s where Iran attacked a tactical operations center there. It’s in Kuwait. Sgt. Cory Hicks was injured in the attack, and he spoke with ABC News.
I seen the nose of that drone pop through, and as soon as it did, I knew what it was. It was either a missile or a drone. So I turned to my right, and that’s when it blew up and just blew the whole building apart.
CHAKRABARTI: Sgt. Hicks suffered facial injuries and extreme internal injuries.
HICKS: Looked around, and I saw everything was just smoke and fire and crazy and chaos.
CHAKRABARTI: It was one of the deadliest attacks on a U.S. base thus far in the Iran war. Six members of the military were killed in the attack, including Hicks’ friend, Master Sergeant Nicole Amor.
HICKS: She was literally five feet from me when that happened. I think if I looked … when I looked over my left shoulder, the drone impacted basically right above her.
CHAKRABARTI: Bill Hennigan, both you and Mackenzie have already mentioned right now vulnerabilities to drones that these bases obviously have exposed.
But haven’t we known that for some time? Drone warfare has now become almost the norm ever since Russia invaded Ukraine.
HENNIGAN: Sure. First of all, the United States has been, used to have, we’ve had, the United States have had air superiority since the Korean War. So it is very, it’s an odd position for the U.S. military to be in where they’re vulnerable from the skies.
And you’re right, these smaller drones have been in vogue basically since the beginning of the counter-ISIS fight when ISIS fighters, put crude munitions on these drones.
And it’s really multiplied, really gone so much more technologically advanced in the battlefields of Ukraine, of course. The United States does know it’s vulnerable. The problem is that there’s no real silver bullet when it comes to having counter drone systems.
There’s the hard kill, which is a kinetic response, shooting it down essentially. Or, there’s the soft kill, which is with electromagnetic noise and spoofing it to make them come down. But it’s a cat and mouse game, and it’s hard to stay ahead of your adversary because as soon as you put in a fix, the adversary adjusts their tactics.
CHAKRABARTI: Mackenzie, I wondered if you wanna talk a little bit more about what we know happened in Port Shuwaiba in Kuwait because I think it’s worth spending a little bit more time with because six service members died there. Do you feel that the Defense Department has continued with its lack of transparency, as you put it earlier?
EAGLEN: So I wanted to add to your great summary and the reporting from CBS News and others. A soldier told the AP, his quote was, “In an instant, a drone crashed through the ceiling and exploded, killing Marzan, who had served in the military for 36 years. The force flung soldiers into the air, fragments of sheet metal and glass shards impaling them.
The tin roof was peeled back like opening up a sardine can,” one soldier recalled. So it’s pretty violent and extensive. And these families are trying to go to press outlets and to Congress Gold Star families now. And then of course, the number of wounded is over 800 as part of Epic Fury.
So it’s not the tragic killed in action, it’s also the wounded. And while this vulnerability has been long known, as you said, Congress is trying to patch, trying to provide a couple of things. A scramble to get cutting-edge technology to the forces forward as fast as possible, but then trying to protect the most critical bases first, because this really is a layered approach, as Bill talked about.
There was a quote though that, to tell you how much farther there is to go, the Air Force Chief of Staff said in a conference in September, “Perhaps those bases wouldn’t have been as damaged as they were if base defense had been stronger across the Middle East.”
CHAKRABARTI: Okay, so let’s stay with that.
Because again, thanks to reporting from places like the AP and CBS, ABC, et cetera, it seems to me that there is a trail of unwillingness to actually move as quickly to shore up or harden defenses as we would have liked to see because I’m seeing here that there was intelligence, there was an intelligencintelligence assessment that said yeah, Shuaiba doesn’t actually have the ability to protect against drones. It has maybe anti-ballistic protection capabilities and that it could be hit.” And there was sort of resistance coming from somewhere in the chain of command to move everybody off base to keep them safe.
Mackenzie, do you get that same read?
EAGLEN: I did, yes that it was considered a secondary strike possibility, but they had been moved from another critical site. And what we see again over and over, whether it’s Army, Navy, or Air Force Iran has seemingly exquisite intelligence and targeting, which are separate, related but separate.
And then within that data sets, they are then very pinpoint accuracy, targeting, equipment, troops where they live and sleep and eat and and then critical sites that we started with earlier.
CHAKRABARTI: So Bill, look, the United States military is vast. It is in the best of times, it is logistically maybe the most sophisticated organization on planet Earth.
But in the not best of times, to just use a military idiom, moving the Pentagon can be like turning a giant ship. It’ll happen eventually, but slowly. But I wonder what you make of this, where there’s all this chatter on the ground in these bases saying, “We need drone defense systems,” but planning continues apace focused on anti-missile systems.
Does this show a lack of nimbleness amongst decision-makers in the Pentagon during, in the middle of a hot war?
HENNIGAN: I think it shows how vexing the problem is when it comes to drones. Ballistic missiles it is shooting, countering ballistic missiles is like shooting a bullet with a bullet.
This is true. But the math behind it is relatively simple. If I throw you a football, you could put yourself in front of that football by watching its trajectory. That’s a ballistic missile. That’s the ball part of ballistic. With these drones, they fly low and slow, and they’re not detectable.
They zigzag. And so it’s a much more challenging problem to shoot these things out of the sky. I do think that the military has been working this problem. I remember writing a story maybe a decade ago about the military appreciating that this was going to be a rising threat and trying to get ahead of it.
But it’s just so challenging to really master the technology. And you see this on the Ukrainian battlefields, right? Every time that Ukraine comes up with a way to stop Russian drones, they come up with another way to get around those defenses. And that’s just the way that it has to be when it comes to missile defense, period, is just that the offensive side has a tremendous advantage over the defense.
CHAKRABARTI: Mackenzie, let me lean on your position as co-chair of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, because I’m getting a sense here that this is an example of fighting the last war. And this is going to date me, but until very recently, basically until last year and this year, honestly, when I thought about U.S. military bases in the Middle East and their particular vulnerabilities, what came to mind were the terrible suicide truck bombers that would try to drive into American bases during the Iran, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
And so the idea that these places were fortresses in the desert was in the popular imagination. But if we’re still trying to protect them as such, but we know now for over basically for almost a year and a half, that the greatest threat’s gonna come from, as Bill said, hard to track, erratic drones from the sky.
Is there evidence that you have that thinking in the Pentagon is mobile enough? Or even, let me just put it this way, planning, procurement, et cetera, can we catch up to the need, the modern needs to adequately protect these bases?
EAGLEN: We can catch up, and they have started partly because of Epic Fury, partly because Congress has been pushing the Pentagon for years to get there.
But the solutions are varied, and the difficulty is in scale in terms of how many numbers of places and people that need to get protected. But we’re talking a combination of hardening, dispersal, expeditionary forces, and very importantly, underground. We must put more items underground.
Iran does this to great effect that we see as they are constantly revealing new fleets of military capability on a regular basis that we haven’t hit before because they were underground. And that same Air Force Chief of Staff, he said it at a conference as well. He said that robust air defenses protected Israel pretty well during this and during Epic Fury.
He said, “American air and space power has often operated from a position of sanctuary. Those days are over. We can no longer treat point defense as a side hustle. It must be a core function.” So it’s a combination of all of these efforts. It’s acquiring that cutting-edge technology, and it’s a nimble defense industrial base.
We’re bringing in new entrants to build it all, right? To own the tech stack and then field it at scale. I am seeing progress across every way you can turn this kaleidoscope, but it’s just not enough. It’s too slow, and it’s in the middle of this very, there may be a ceasefire, as we all know, there are constant strikes.
The Navy’s conducting four missions alone right now in or around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. One of which the Chief of Naval Operations said the Navy is too small to perform at, for an extended period. So that should give you a sense of why it’s so difficult to do it in the middle of this shooting war, but just to do it in general by the military.
Part III
CHAKRABARTI: Let’s hear a little bit more from Jonah Kaplan at CBS News, who talked a little bit about why service members were actually willing to share those pictures, the videos, and documents of the attacks with him.
KAPLAN: They share these with me not because they want the U.S. to look bad, not because they’re against the war effort, not because they’re against the administration. They share these because they want it to be used as a lesson, as a wake-up call. What can we discern from these? How can we learn from these experiences to prevent other catastrophes, other attacks on U.S. soldiers in the future?
How can we shore up our defenses? How can we be better at defending and protecting U.S. assets and making sure Iran does not exact more of a heavy toll on US positions as we continue this effort overseas?
CHAKRABARTI: Jonah Kaplan there with CBS News. Bill Hennigan, I suppose one way to shore up the defense of military assets overseas has to do with what both you and Mackenzie have said, and that is it has to do with intelligence.
Mackenzie used the word Iran’s exquisite intelligence, and I would agree. Do we know where Iran’s getting it from, that they can target the bases and specific buildings within the U.S. bases so precisely?
HENNIGAN: Yeah, we do know that, again so the locations of some of these bases are, have been known for years of course.
But the finer points of what you’re describing and what Mackenzie was talking about where they’re hitting specific places where people are sleeping and where the people are eating, this sort of thing is largely believed to be coming from Russia.
The Iranians have also targeted warships, off their coast as well. And this sort of intelligence can only come from some a nation state who has that sort of real-time capability, and it’s there’s been various reporting that Russia’s providing this sort of intelligence to the Iranian forces.
CHAKRABARTI: … This would be the same Russia that President Trump recently relaxed sanctions on so that the United States could buy Russian diesel to ostensibly lower the cost of diesel in the United States. It’s not going to do that. That seems completely at odds then with keeping U.S. military members safe in the Middle East if, and Bill’s right.
I think we know that the intel’s coming from Russia. How do you untie that knot, Mackenzie?
EAGLEN: It’s not easy. The head of the United States Strategic Command for the U.S. military said recently, “There’s no such thing anymore as a regional conflict.” And I think this is in part what he was getting at, which is, North Korea sent ammo in the early days and then sent actual North Koreans to die in Ukraine on behalf of Russia.
And China’s using, sharing AI and also presumably satellite. They’re helping ship armaments to Iran. Russia, clearly here, our own Congressional Research Service confirmed what was just said, that Russia is providing terrific intelligence on a timely basis that’s accurate to support Iran killing American service members and wounding them.
So we see the axis of aggressors, whether or not it’s coordinated, they are absolutely effectively working together, which, in whatever conflict, whether that’s Epic Fury, whether it’s to pin down Israel, whether it’s Ukraine, Russia, all over the world. And these are all in some ways linked, and it’s very difficult for the Navy is maximally concentrated on Epic Fury alone right now. Too much at the expense of the other problems it needs to worry about in the rest of the world. And again, this is an interconnected global set of problems, and so that’s not great.
CHAKRABARTI: So I want to get back to this new geopolitical reality and the interconnectedness that you said for the last part of the conversation today.
But circling back to just sheer dollar value, the inspector general at the Department of Defense did put out a report, I think the most recent one I saw was in June, I’m not sure if there’s been one since then cataloging the cost of Operation Epic Fury at that point, up until June 29th. And the cost, according to the inspector general, comes out at, what?
$33 billion as of June 29th. But I just wanna remember, Mackenzie, at the beginning of the show, you said that does not include the cost to the damaged bases.
EAGLEN: That is correct, which I now put at $10 billion from February 28th until today. 9.9 to be precise, and it’s all up at the aei.org website the detailed breakdown.
And not only that, in our analysis to estimate these costs, which we don’t have government data to do we were extremely conservative in those estimates, but also tried to account for a lot of the atypical and hidden costs. Whether you walk away from these or not the Pentagon has said the reason they’re not including any fees for any reconstruction or even just abandonment of some facilities and places outright is because they don’t know the future force posture in the Middle East, and not sure what’s going to happen to independent structures.
And then they don’t know if allies will contribute to the rebuilding if it happens. Those are all fair statements, but that’s not an excuse for not having this information publicly available.
CHAKRABARTI: We did reach out to the Office of the Inspector General at the Pentagon for further information or updated cost or asking the question that you were asking, “Why did they not include the cost of rebuilding bases?”
They sent us back a statement saying, quote, “The lead inspector general continues to assess the full extent of damage to U.S. government facilities and associated cost to U.S. taxpayers as required through congressionally mandated quarterly reports. The Operation Epic Fury quarterly report provides unclassified information regarding losses to U.S. assets.
The report speaks for itself, and since we do not have additional information to provide at this time, we respectfully decline.” End quote. Okay, but that doesn’t mean the questions go away, right? So let’s listen to, for a second, to retired Admiral … James Stavridis, who also served as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO for a while.
He currently doing some military analysis for CNN, and he had this response to the inspector general’s report.
As the nation, our nation decides whether or not to rebuild this massive, extensive footprint in the Middle East, we have to think about those costs. We have to think about the geopolitics of this.
And I think there are going to be some pretty significant changes ahead.
CHAKRABARTI: Bill Hennigan, in your Times piece, you wrote this startling fact, “America has nearly three times as many foreign bases as it has embassies, consulates, and missions, and roughly double the number of foreign bases of all other countries combined.”
Is there a persuasive argument right now that maybe we don’t need as many, and some of these extremely damaged facilities should not be rebuilt?
HENNIGAN: I think the extensive damage to these constellation of bases speaks for itself, right? It’s just not sustainable in the same way that it was before.
It’s all good and fine when you can thwart enemy aircraft from flying over your bases and dropping bombs on you, but that simply isn’t the case any longer. And we need to, in my estimation, and I believe the military is already moving in this direction it seems by drawing down forces on some of these bases, that they’re going to have to condense the bases that they have to fewer numbers.
They’re gonna have to consolidate defenses on those bases, and they’re going to have to start putting things underground, as Mackenzie said. It’s just it’s unavoidable at this point. And it’s not only overseas. We have so many bases and we do need foreign bases. We can’t just remove ourselves from the world.
We would leave a huge vacuum for our adversaries to fill. So it’s not like we can just say, “Ah,” wash our hands with the situation. But our bases here in the United States are also vulnerable to attack. You can’t drive, fly drones across the Pacific Ocean or whatever but you can get those drones inside the United States and find targets over bases as well.
So we have a real big problem on our hands to figure out in going in the future years here about how to counter this growing threat.
CHAKRABARTI: Mackenzie, what’s your take on that?
EAGLEN: So because we’re a global power with interests all over the place, particularly keeping the global commons free and open because it’s good for our economy and our way of life, and that includes, space operations, GPS, precision timing and navigation, as well as commerce, whether that is across the open ocean.
It’s how most of our stuff gets to us. High-value cargo moves typically by air, but everything else moves by ship and then truck. This is extremely important to America, and we have these two huge oceans, so we do have to be forward, just as Bill exactly said. We also always have to play an away game with our military, and therefore it’s hugely inefficient in terms of cost and time to try and move everything from continental United States every time you wanna do something somewhere.
Having things pre-positioned and forward you use the base infrastructure as lily pads to prosecute operations everywhere around the globe, and so there is no pulling back. That’s not a viable … You can do some consolidating and then we can do better planning but a total pullback is unrealistic.
I know nobody said that. But it’s necessary to prosecute global operations to be forward at the point of need when you need it.
And it’s not just war fighting, right? You want to keep problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming war, so you’re also forward to keep the peace, too.
CHAKRABARTI: I feel like that you’re right. No one said, I’m sure some Americans actually probably want all U.S. military bases eliminated from outside the United States, but no one seriously is having that conversation now. But the sort of reducing the number or if some of these bases are going to be rebuilt, rebuilding them for a different kind of forward posture, as you’re saying, one that’s maybe not a place where you’re going to have 10,000 personnel at one time and a lots of heavy equipment, but something that’s designed more for the kind of warfare we’re seeing now and in the future.
I don’t know what to call it other than a more responsive lightweight type of launching drones from those areas, but maybe the people piloting those drones don’t have to be at Al Udeid in in Qatar. Do you see what, do you see what I’m saying? And that could actually then reduce the footprint of the United States without reducing the military’s responsive effectiveness.
EAGLEN: I do see what you’re saying, and I look at the Navy and its Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and the acting Secretary of the Navy’s direct quote was, “Iran blew the hell out of it.” And that particular location commands 2.5 million square miles of maritime terrain for the Navy. They’re now doing it from the continental United States, that same mission, but again, in terms of time and efficiency and cost, it is not any of those.
But the re-look, this is an opportunity to think about how to do things differently, more nimbly and with better protection, however they do it, in ways we talked about earlier.
CHAKRABARTI: Bill Hennigan, I also, I mentioned at the very beginning that Al Udeid base is jointly operated.
It was originally actually built by the Qatari government. The U.S. obviously runs it now, along with the Qataris and the UK. So we actually have to, I wanted to just make a note that the calculus has changed for regional partners as well, because those bases being there hasn’t protected Bahrain and it hasn’t protected Kuwait, it hasn’t protected Qatar.
And also at the same time here in the United States, we just had a see change election where not just Democrats, but a lot of Republicans who decided to cross the aisle and vote for Democrats, maybe for the first time in their lives, did so because they don’t want tens of billions of dollars spent on things like an excessive number of bases outside the United States, whereas that money could be better spent inside the United States.
Do you think that is actually gonna start or that decision-makers in the Pentagon are seeing that as well?
HENNIGAN: Tthis debacle of a conflict is going to create such a domino effect of change within the military. I think we recognize that our bases are vulnerable, our personnel is vulnerable, our footprint as it stands is no longer tenable.
We cannot just have multimillion-dollar aircraft sitting on a tarmac in the Middle East and not think that they’re not gonna be targets for an adversary to blow apart. I think that the Democrats and Republicans understand this problem. I think that the political winds are such that it will make change more possible because of the mandate that the Democrats have.
But I think that people don’t, Americans I don’t think really understand how devastating this has been on our forces in the Middle East and our footprint there. It will be shaken for a generation and we will not be able to go back to where the way it was.
This article was originally published on WBUR.org.


